SĀṀKHYA KĀRIKĀ

of

ĪŚVARA KṚṢṆA

with

THE TATTVA KAUMUDĪ

of

Śrī Vācaspati Miśra

With Sanskrit text of the Kārikā, transliteration and word-for-word meaning, and a free rendering into English of the Tattva Kaumudī with Notes

by

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

We have great pleasure in presenting to our thoughtful readers this English translation of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's Sāmkhya kārikā with the gloss of Vācaspati Miśra.

Sāmkhya forms one of the most important pillars constituting the six systems (ṣaḍdarśana) of Indian philosophy. Its contribution to our knowledge of Reality and the world is seminal. Today Vedanta rules the roost, and modern science is finding itself more and more in agreement with the intuitive perceptions of this sixth darśana; but it must be noted that Vedanta takes off to ethereal heights only from the granite platform provided by Sāmkhya. Vedanta accepts most of the basic concepts of Sāmkhya — like the nature of the misery-go-round called Samsara; the triple sufferings we are heir to; the three guṇas of Prakṛti in terms of which can be explained not only the manifold objects of the universe, but also the workings of the mind and the psyche and even the rationale of medical therapy (Ayurveda); the process of evolution, long before Western science began to think in terms of it; and the nature of Pure Consciousness in which the individual must merge for total liberation. Sāmkhya reduces everything to two entities — Prakṛti and Puruṣa. What Vedanta does is to integrate these two further into one splendid all-comprehensive Unity.

Not only Vedanta, but also modern science, cannot be understood in all their nuances without a firm grasp of the Sāmkhyan tenets. May this translation of the Sāmkhya kārikā, therefore, offer rich pabulum to all interested in finding more about themselves and the mysterious universe they inhabit.

—Madras
November 1995

INTRODUCTION

Every being in this world without exception seeks happiness. Even an insignificant creature as an ant tries to avoid pain by crawling away from the railway track when the mighty railway engine crosses the track. But the true nature of happiness cannot be explained by any one who lacks the philosophical instinct. According to Sāṅkhya Philosophers, total isolation of the Puruṣa from Prakṛti that causes the threefold pain, is the way for true happiness. They further say that worldly enjoyments are like honey mixed with poison, the sip of a drop of which is enough to end all happiness. So, after they realise such a state of happiness by right cognition of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Cogniser, they are moved with sympathy for the worldly who quiver in the pit of worldly enjoyments. This in brief, is the origin of philosophical enquiry according to the Sāṅkhya system.

Of all the philosophical systems, the Sāṅkhya philosophy is considered to be the most ancient school of thought. Sāṅkhya philosophy maintains a prominent place in all the Śāstras since it is either contraverted or supported by every other philosophical system. Śaṅkarācārya says: "This doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedāṅta doctrine since like the latter, it admits the non-difference of cause and effect and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma sūtras, such as Devala and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the Pradhāna doctrine".

In the Mahābhārata it is said that there is no knowledge such as Sāṅkhya and no power like that of Yoga. We should have no doubt as to Sāṅkhya being the highest knowledge. (Śāntiparva 316-2).

Sāṅkhya is derived from the word 'Saṁkhyā', meaning a sense of thinking and counting. Here thinking is with reference to some basic principles of the knowledge of Puruṣa and counting

refers to the twenty four Principles born out of Prakṛti. This double implication of the word has been set forth by Vijñāna Bhikṣu in his preface to the Sāṅkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya:

संख्यां प्रकुर्वते चैव प्रकृतिं च प्रचक्षते ।
तत्त्वानि च चतुर्विंशत्तेन सांख्यं प्रकीर्तितम् ॥

So, Sānkhya means knowledge of Self through right discrimination. The references to Sāṅkhya Sūtras are found in the Vedas. For example, Tamas is described in the Rig Veda as:

"तम आसीद् तमसा गूळ्हमग्रे अप्रकेतम्" (X-129-3).

which later assumed the form of the unmanifest. This very Rig Veda shows the dissolution of the elements of the elemental world in its cause, thus indicating *Satkārya Vāda* to which philosophy Sāṅkhya belongs. Even the Pradhāna is referred to as Ajā and the Veda explains it as below: (Rig Veda X 82.6)

तमिद्गर्भं प्रथमं दध्र आपो यत्र देवाः समगच्छन्त विश्वे ।
अजस्य नाभावध्येकमर्षितं यस्मिन् विश्वानि भुवनानि तस्थुः ॥

Further, the Sattva, Rajas and Tamas of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy is explained in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, and the Sāṅkhya categories are clearly mentioned in Kaṭha Upaniṣad (3.10,11). It is a well known fact that Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad is essentially a Sāṅkhya Upaniṣad because it clearly mentions the Sāṅkhya catagories. In the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, the word 'Sāṅkhya' and 'Kapila' have been used for the first time (6.13). Again in the same Upanisad words like Vyakta, Avyakta and Jña also are found (1.8). Similarly the use of the words Pradhāna, Prakṛti and Guṇa is also found here (1st Chapter 10, 4th Chapter 10, 1st Chapter 13). The mention of such words as Sattva, Rajas and Tamas by name, the exposition of five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements, the reference to the Sāṅkhya categorises of Kṣetrajña, Saṅkalpa, Adhyavasāya, Abhimāna and Liṅga clearly show that these Upaniṣads were

formed after the formulation of the Sāṅkhya system of thought. In the Mahābhārata and Purāṇas we find the Sāṅkhya Philosophy fully explained. Those who want to know details of references to Sāṅkhya are requested to consult the elaborate introduction of Sāṅkhya by Mahā Mahopādhyāya Ganganath Jha.

Kapila is generally known as a founder of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy. As regards its historicity, many scholars hold different view points which have not been dealt with here. But, generally, it is believed that Kapila was the founder of the Sāṅkhya system of thought. He had a disciple by name Āsuri. Āsuri's disciple was Pañca Śikhā. After him we hear the name Vindhyāvāsa. Next we find the name of Varṣaganya as a teacher of Sāṅkhya. He is followed by Jaigīṣavya. According to some scholars, Jaigīṣavya was a classmate of Pañca Śikhā. In the list of names next we find Voḍhu after that of Asuri and before that of Pañca Śikha. Then, the names of Devala and Sanaka appear. Then the name of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa as a teacher of Sāṅkhya appears. He was born in a Kauśika family. (For details see The Tattva Kaumudi of MM Ganganath Jha).

Of the standard works on Sāṅkhya only three are available at present, viz,: Sāṅkhya Sūtra, Tattva Samāsa and Sāṅkhya Karikā. Īśvara Kṛṣṇa appears to be older than Vasubandhu and must have flourished somewhere in the 1st or 2nd century A.D. The work of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa had 70 verses in it.

A brief synopsis of the cardinal principles of Sāṅkhya philosophy is given here to facilitate the study of Sāṅkhya. The Sāṅkhya lays down four-fold divisions of categories based on their respective causal and productive efficiency. They are: 1) Productive 2) Productive and Produced 3) Produced and 4) Neither Productive nor Produced. This classification into a four-fold division includes twenty four tattwas also. The root product is called the Prakṛti or Nature, being purely productive. The second variety are the other principles like Buddhi etc. This

partakes of the nature of the both, the productive and the produced, inasmuch as Buddhi evolves ahaṁkāra and the rest. The purely Non-productive but the Produced principles are the eleven sense organs and the five material substances. The Puruṣa is neither the Productive nor the Produced and also it is without any attributes. All the accessories that we see are the effects of the Guṇas, and the Spirit by its very nature is totally free from all these.

According to the Sāṇkhya Philosophy, a non-entity can never be made an entity, that is to say, that which has never existed can never be brought into existence. the cause only helps the operation of the manifestation of the effect, i.e, its manifestation has an effect of a particular cause, e.g, the production of oil from oil seeds in which they are lying latent. Thus we find the effect is always in one way or other related to the cause. But this is not possible if the effects were a non-entity because a non-entity can have no relation. If the effect is not related with the cause then every effect would be possible for every cause, thus creating an absurdity of causes and effects. The causal efficiency consists in the existence of the effect in the cause in a latent condition like oil subsisting only in the seeds but not in the sand. Further, the effect is non-different from the cause and the former being an entity, the latter must also be an entity. For example, the cloth is not different from the threads composing it because it is neither heavier nor lighter than the cause nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads.

Of all the Schools of Thought, Sāṅkhya school occupied an intermediate position between the Idealist Vedānta and the Realist Pūrva Mīmāsā group. The Sāṅkhya is both realistic and dualistic inasmuch as it holds Prakṛti to be an ultimate reality along with Puruṣa. A close study of Sāṅkhya reveals that it is only close to Vedanta.

Aum

Propitiatory Verse:

Our reverential salutations to the One Unborn, Red, White and Black, that produces many offsprings. We also bow to those Unborn Ones who, having recourse to Her, renounce Her after having enjoyed the pleasures bestowed by Her.

We salute the Great Muni Kapila, his disciple, the Muni Āsuri, as also Pañcaśikhā and Īśvara Kṛṣṇa.

In this world, the exposition (of a doctrine) by an expounder is listened to only by those who desire a knowledge of that doctrine. But one who expounds doctrines not desired is disregarded by men of critical wisdom like a mad man, as neither a man of the world nor a critical examiner expounds a doctrine which is neither related to secular things nor is worthy of critical study. People desire to listen to an exposition of only that doctrine which, when understood, leads to the attainment of the supreme aim of man. Since the knowledge of the subject matter to be expounded (hereafter) serves as a means to the realisation of the supreme goal of man, the Author introduces the inquiry into the subject-matter:

दुःखत्रयाभिघातात् जिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेतौ ।
दृष्टे साऽपार्था चेत् नैकान्तात्यन्ततोऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥

Duḥkhatrayābhighātāt, From the torment by the three-fold (causes of) pain (there arises); *jijñāsā,* a desire for inquiry; *tadapaghātake hetau,* into the means of terminating it; *Dṛṣṭe,*

(there existing) visible means; *sā,* it (ie the inquiry); *apārthā,* superfluous; *cet,* if it be said; *na,* (we reply) not so; *ekānta-atyaṅtataḥ-abhāvāt,* (since in them) there is the absence of certainty and permanency.

1. From the torment caused by the three kinds of pain, proceeds a desire for inquiry into the means of terminating them; if it be said that (the inquiry) is superfluous since visible means exist, (we reply), not so; because (in the visible means) there is the absence of certainty (in the case of the means) and permanency (of pain).

The subject matter of this study would not be inquired into if there existed no pain in this world; or, if existent, its removal were not desired; or, if desired, its removal were impossible. Impossibility of removal of pain is of two kinds: (a) from eternality of pain; and (b) from the ignorance of the means of removing it. Even if there existed the possibility of its removal, the non-adequacy of the means afforded by the knowledge of the subject-matter of the śāstra; or, because of the existence of some other easier means (than the one explained in the subject-matter).

It cannot be said that there is no pain or that its removal is not desired (as these are opposed to experienced facts); so it is said: *From the torment,* ie by the impact of *the three-fold pain.* The three kinds of pain constitute '*duḥkatraya* - the triad of pain.' These are *Ādhyātmika* - intra-organic, *Ādhibhautika,* caused by external influences, and, *Ādhidaivika* - caused by supernatural agencies. Here, the intra-organic is two-fold; bodily and mental. Bodily pain is caused by the disorder of wind, bile and phlegm, and mental misery is caused by lust, anger, greed, infatuation, fear, envy, grief and non-perception of particular objects. All these are called 'intra-organic' as they are amenable to internal remedies. Pains that are responsive to external remedies are of two-varieties; they are (a) *Ādhibhautika,* ie caused by external influences, and (b) *Ādhidaivika,* ie caused by

supernatural influences. *Ādhibhautika* misery is caused by man, beasts, birds, reptiles and plants and inanimate things, and *Ādhidaivika* misery is caused by the evil influence of *Yakṣa* (a class of demi-gods who are described as the attendants of Kubera), *Rākṣasa* (goblin, evil spirit), *Vināyaka* (Gaṇeśa) and (superhuman beings that cause obstacles) and planets etc. Thus, this pain which is a particular modification of the attribute of *Rajas,* is experienced by every soul individually and, as such, its existence cannot be denied. *Abhighāta* (torment, assault) is the contact of the 'Sentient Principle' with the three-fold pain subsisting in the mind (internal faculty) in a disagreeable manner. Thus, the disagreeable nature of the sensation is said to be the cause of the desire for alleviating it (ie the three-fold pain, as explained above).

Though pain cannot be absolutely rooted out, yet it can be overpowered, as will be explained subsequently. Quite appropriately, therefore, it is said: *Tadapaghātake hetau.* Removal of these three kinds of pain is tadapaghātaka. Though 'the triad of pain'(duḥkhatraya) forms the subordinate factor (in the compound duḥkhatrayābhighātāt)' yet, it is to be considered as proximate to Buddhi and so it is referred to by 'tat' in 'tadapaghātaka.'

Here a doubt is raised: *Dṛṣṭe sā apārthā cet - since visible means of remedy exist, such an inquiry is superfluous.* This is the meaning: well, let there be the three kinds of pain, the desirability of their removal, and also the possibility of their removal; also granted that the means set forth in the scriptures are adequate to the removal of pain. Even then, the inquiry (into the subject matter) by men is not worthy of pursuing inasmuch as easier visible means capable of removing pain are available. Also because this knowledge of the *Tattvas* is attainable only with great difficulties after undergoing long and arduous course of traditional study through many generations. Says a popular

maxim: 'When honey is available in a nearby place, wherefore should one go to the mountains?' When easier means for the attainment of the object of desire exist, which wise man will exert himself further?

Hundreds of easy remedies for physical pain are prescribed by eminent physicians. For removal of mental sufferings also we have easy remedies in the form of attainment of objects of enjoyment like charming women, pleasing drinks, food, cosmetics, dress, ornaments and the like. Likewise, we have also easy remedies for the removal of extra-organic miseries such as proficiency in the science of ethics and politics, residence in safe places etc. In the same way, we have easy remedies to get rid of troubles caused by supernatural agencies, in the shape of gems, charms etc.

Rejects the aforesaid view: Not so; why?

'Because of the absence of certainty and permanency.'

Ekānta is the certainty of the cessation of pain; *Atyanta* is the non-recurrence of the pain that has been removed. The absence of the above two is denoted by the expression *ekāntātyantato abhāva.* Here, the Universal affix *Tasi* has a genitive force. This is the purport: since the cessation of (the three-fold) pain like intraorganic etc is not seen even after employing in prescribed manner, curatives such as medicinal herbs, charming women, study of ethics and political science and use of incantations etc there is the absence of certainty (of the removal of pain); also since we see the recurrence of pain that was once cured, (we infer that) there is also the absence of permanency (of the cure affected). Thus, though easily available, the obvious means do not bring about absolute and permanent cure. Therefore, the inquiry (into the doctrine) is certainly not superfluous.

Though the mention of the word *duḥkham* (in the very beginning) is inauspicious, yet the means that lead to its

termination are auspicious; as such, it is quite appropriate at the commencement of a treatise.

Accepted that there is no visible means (by which the triad of pain could be removed absolutely and finally). But we have means prescribed in the Vedas such as *Jyotiṣṭoma* etc lasting for a whole year, and host of other ritualistic rites which will certainly and permanently remove the three kinds of pain. The *Śruti* also declares: 'One desiring heavenly enjoyments should perform sacrifices.' *Svarga* is explained (in *Tantra Vārtika*) thus: '*Svarga (svaḥ)* is that happiness which is endless and continuous and unmixed with unhappiness, and is attained by intense longing for it;' 'Heaven is a special kind of happiness that counteracts unhappiness and is thus capable of extirpating misery by its own inherent power. Nor is this happiness perishable, for, the *Śruti* declares: 'We drank the *Soma* juice and became immortal' (Atharva-Śiras-3). If it (happiness) were liable to destruction, where then is the possibility of immortality? Hence the Vedic means which are capable of removing the three-fold pain in a moment, in a few hours, in a day and night, in a month or in a year, are much easier than the Discriminative Knowledge which can be achieved only with great exertion extending over many lives. Thus, we say, the proposed enquiry (into the doctrine) is superfluous. The next Kārikā provides the answer to this doubt:

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ।
तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥

Ānuśravikaḥ, the revealed, Vedic; *dṛṣṭavat,* (is) like the obvious means; *hi,* because; *saḥ,* it is (ie the Vedic means); *aviśuddhi-kṣaya-atiśaya yuktaḥ,* attended with impurity, decay and excess; *tadviparītaḥ,* (the means) opposite to both (the visible and the Vedic means); (and proceeding from) *vyakta-avyakta-jña-vijñānāt,* the Discriminative Knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Cogniser (Spirit); *sreyān,* is preferable.

2. The scriptural means is like the obvious means since it is linked with impurity, decay and excess. The means contrary to both and proceeding from the Discriminative Knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Spirit, is superior.

Ānuśrava is Veda because it is *heard* by the disciple following the Guru's utterance; that is to say, it is only memorised (by the disciple) and not written down (ie created) by any one (like the Mahābhārata). Thus *Ānuśravika* is that which is known (from the Guru in the class). Though it is Vedic, the host of ritualistic means prescribed therein are similar to the obvious remedies as both the means are equally incapable of removing the three-fold pain absolutely or permanently. Though *ānuśravika* is the common denotation (for both the *Karma kāṇda* and the *Jñāna kāṇda*), it ought to be taken here as implying only the ritualistic section of the Vedas. The Śruti also declares: Ātman ought to be known, realised and discriminated from the Prakṛti (Br. Up.) He (the *Ātmavit*) does not return, he does not return (to this world). (Ch.Up.8-15).

Reasons for the above declaration are given: *It* (the scriptural means) *is attended with impurity, decay and excess.* It is *impure* because sacrifices like *soma yajña* etc are perfored by the sacrifice of animals and destruction of corn etc. Bhagavān Pañcaśikhācārya says: It (the sacrifice of animals etc) is slightly mixed (with impurity), remediable and bearable. *Svalpaḥ-saṅkaraḥ* means the admixture of the slight sin, productive of evil, caused by the slaughter of animals etc with the principal merit born of the performance of sacrifices like *Jyotiṣṭoma* etc. By *Saparihāra* is meant that the evil is removable by certain expiatory rites. But, if due to inadvertance, expiatory rites are not observed, then, it (ie the demerit caused by the slaughter of animals) also bears fruit at the time of the fruition of the principal *karma* (ie merit). As long as these evil effects are produced so long they are borne with patience;

hence it is qualified as *sapratyavamarṣa.* Adepts who are immersed in the huge lakes of heavenly nectar obtained by the performance of virtuous deeds bear patiently the spark of the fire of misery brought about by sin (caused by animal slaughter etc).

It cannot be said that the general injunction, 'One should not injure any living being,' sets aside the specific injunction, 'one should kill the animal dedicated to the *Agni-soma* sacrifice,' because of the absence of mutual contradiction. It is only when there is mutual contradiction, the weaker gets superseded by the stronger. Here there is no such contradiction because they deal with two quite different subjects. For, the prohibitory injunction 'do not kill' only declares that killing produces sin (and causes pain); but it does not do away with the fact of its being necessary for the completion of the sacrifice. The sentence: 'kill the animal meant for *Agni-soma*' only declares the necessity of animal slaughter in the performance of sacrifice; it does not suggest the absence of evil consequences arising from killing of animals. If it did so, there will be a split in the sentence to the effect that (a) killing is helpful in performing sacrifice and (b) it does not produce sin. Nor is there any contradiction between its being the cause of sin (arising from the slaughter of the animal in the sacrifice) and its (of animal slaughter) being helpful in the performance of sacrifice. Animal slaughter causes sin in man while at the same time it also helps man in the performance of the sacrifice.

Though the terms *decay* and *excess* (used in the above *Kārikā*) really relate to the effect, here they are attributed to the *means.* This quality of *decay* in heaven is inferred as it is a positive entity and a product. Further, it is said that sacrifices like *Jyotiṣṭoma* are the means of attaining mere heaven, whereas sacrifices like *Vājapeya* etc lead one to self sovereignty. This inequality in the result is what constitutes *excess* spoken of

(in the *Kārikā*). Verily, the superior prosperity of one man makes another of lesser prosperity sad!

Immortality denoted in the passage 'We drank soma and became immortal' indicates long durability. It is said elsewhere: 'Verily, immortality is the durability extending till the final dissolution of all the elements (ie of the entire universe).' Hence, the *Śruti* declares: 'Neither by deeds nor by progeny nor by wealth but by renunciation alone they attained immortality; that which the hermits enter is laid beyond the heavens and yet it shines brilliantly in the heart' (M.N.Up.12-14); and also, 'Sages with children and desiring wealth got only death (as reward) by *actions* while those other sages who were wise attained immortality which is beyond all actions.'

With all this in view, it is said: *the means contrary to them (to both and proceeding from the Discriminative Knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Spirit) is preferable.* Therefore, that which is contrary to the Vedic means of alleviating pain, such as drinking of soma etc which are impure and which bring about results that lack permanency and equality, is the pure means which, unmixed with evil (on account of animal slaughter) etc brings about permanent and most superior (unsurpassed) results. (This is clear from) the often repeated declarations of the *Śruti* that a person of Discriminative Knowledge never returns to metempsychosis. Now, it is not proper to say that this result (of knowledge) is impermanent inasmuch as it is a *caused entity;* because, such arguements hold good only if the effect is a *positive entity;* in the present case, however, *removal of pain* which though an effect, is a *negative entity* and is therefore otherwise. Nor can it produce some other pain, because, no effect can take place when the cause itself becomes defunct, for, causal activity lasts only till such time as the attainment of Discriminative Knowledge. And this will be explained later on (in *Kārikā* No.66).

The literal meaning of the words of the *Kārikā* is this: The means of destroying pain in the form of immediate Discriminative Knowledge of the Spirit as different from Matter, is contrary to the Vedic means that are capable of removing pain, and hence it is preferable. The Vedic means also are good inasmuch as they are prescribed by the Veda and as such capable of alleviating pain to a certain extent. The Discriminative Knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Matter is also good; of these two excellent means, the Discriminative Knowledge of the Spirit that is quite distinct from Matter, is superior.

Question: When indeed does this (knowledge) arise?

Answer: From the right knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser. The knowledge of the Manifested precedes the knowledge of the Unmanifested which is the cause of the former; and from the fact of these existing for another's purpose, the knowledge of Puruṣa is gained. Thus it is seen that these three are mentioned in the order of precedence of the knowledge thereof. The meaning of all this is that the knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Matter is gained first by having heard with discrimination the real nature of the Manifested etc from the Śruti (Vedas), Smṛti (Canonical texts), Ithihāsa (historical accounts) and Purāṇas (mythology); then, by duly having established the same through scientific reasoning, and finally by absorbing that knowledge into oneself by earnest and uninterrupted contemplation for a long time. It is explained thus (in Kārikā-64): 'Thus, from the practice of Truth, is produced the wisdom in the form: 'I am not, naught is mine, and not 'I', which is complete and pure on account of the absence of error and which is absolute.'

Having thus first established the fact of the usefulness of the scientific enquiry to the enquirer, the author, with a view to commence the work, sets down briefly the import of the system with a view to focusing the attention of the enquirer:

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥

Mūlaprakṛtiḥ, The root evolvent (or Primal Nature); *Avikṛtiḥ,* is non-evolute; *Mahadādyāḥ,* Mahat etc; *Prakṛtivikṛtayaḥ,* evolvent and evolutes; *Sapta,* are Seven; *ṣoḍaśakaḥ,* sixteen; *tu,* are merely; *vikārāḥ,* evolutes; *Puruṣaḥ,* the Spirit; *na,* is neither; *Prakṛtiḥ,* the evolvent; *na,* not; *Vikṛtiḥ,* the evolute.

3. The Primal Nature is non-evolute. The group of seven beginning with the Great Principle (*Buddhi*) and the rest are both evolvents and evolutes. But the sixteen (five organs of sense, five of action, the mind and the five gross elements) are only evolutes. The Spirit is neither the evolvent nor the evolute.

Briefly, the objects treated in the Scripture are of four varieties. Some objects are merely evolvents; some objects are merely evolutes; some are both evolvents and evolutes. Some others are neither the evolvent nor the evolute.

Question: What is the Primal evolvent?

Answer: *The Primal Nature is non-evolute.* That which procreates or evolves (ie brings into existence other *Tattvas*) is *Prakṛti*; it is also called *Pradhāna,* the Primordial, representing the state of equipoise of (the attributes) of *Sattwa, Rajas* and *Tamas* and is non-evolute, that is to say, it is only an Evolvent. It is explained: *Mūla.* It is the Root-evolvent (*Mūla-Prakṛti*) because it is the root (of all other evolutes) while also being at the same time the Primal Matter. It is the root of the aggregate of all products (ie the universe), while it has no root of its own (ie it is uncaused). (If a cause to *Prakṛti* also is posited) it would land us in unwarranted *regressus ad infinitum,* because, a further cause of that cause would also have to be postulated and this would lead to an endless series of causes which is irrational and not consistent with valid reason.

Question: How many are the objects which are both evolvents and evolutes? And which are those?

Answer: Evolvent-evolutes are seven beginning with *Mahat,* ie they are both evolvent and evolutes. The Great Principle (*Mahat* or *Buddhi*) is the cause of *Ahaṅkāra.* (I-Principle), while it is itself (*being*) the product of the Root evolvent. Similarly, the Principle of *Ahaṅkāra* is the cause of the five Primary elements (*Tanmātras*) and (*eleven*) sense-organs (*Iṅdriyas*), itself being the effect of *Buddhi.* In the same way, the five Primary elements are the causes of gross elements like the ether (*ākāśa*) etc while they are themselves the evolutes of *Ahaṅkāra,* the I-Principle.

Question: How many are the evolutes and what are they?

Answer: Evolutes are 'sixteen' in number; 'Sixteen' because they are limited by that number; they are: five gross elements and eleven sense organs; these are merely evolutes (modifications) and not evolvent. The particle *tu* (in the text) is used to emphasise this. (Though *tu* is placed before *vikārāḥ* in the text) it should be taken as coming after *vikārāḥ.* Cow, jar, tree, etc are the modifications of 'earth' element; similarly, curd and sprout are of milk and seed respectively, milk and seed being modification of cow and tree. This difference does not affect (the above position) because tree etc are not different from earth in their *essence.* It is the *productiveness* of something different in essence for which the term *Prakṛti* stands and *cow, tree,* etc do not differ from each other in essence. This is proved by the fact that they all have the common property of being gross and are preceptible by the senses.

Now, that which is neither of the above two, is described thus: 'The Spirit is neither an evolute nor an evolvent.' All this will be explained later on.

In order to establish the above proposition, the different kinds of proof (valid means of cognition) ought to be described.

A special definition cannot be framed without first framing the general definition. Therefore, common definitions of the means of right cognition follow:

दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् ।
त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥ ४ ॥

Dṛṣṭaṁ, perception; *anumānaṁ,* inference; *ca,* and; *āptavacanaṁ,* statement of trust-worthy persons;*sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt,* because (by these three) all (other) proofs are (also) established; *trividhaṁ,* three fold; *pramāṇaṁ,* proof; *iṣṭam,* intended; *pramāṇāt hi,* through the means of cognition alone; *prameyasiddhiḥ,* establishment of things to be proved.

4. Perception, Inference and Valid Testimony are the means; (by these) all other means of right cognition too are established (as they are included in the above three); proof is intended to be of three kinds. It is through the proofs that the provables are established.

Here, the term *pramāṇa* (means of cognition) indicates the *things to be defined;* the explanation of the term is *definition; pramāṇa* is that by which things are rightly cognised; because of this (explanation) *pramāṇa* comes to be recognised as the *instrument of right cognition.* And this is a modification of the mind (*cittavṛtti*) in relation to an object, which is free from (such defects as) ambiguity, perversion, and non-apprehension. *Right cognition* is the result brought about by this instrument in the form of apprehension by a human agent, and its means is *pramāṇa.* By this the definition of *pramāṇa* does not apply to all other means which lead to doubt, wrong apprehension and recollection.

The author rejects conflicting views with regard to the number of *pramāṇas* by declaring that they are *of three kinds,* that is to say, of the common means of Right Cognition there are

only three kinds, neither more nor less. This we shall explain after first explaining special definitions (of the means of Right Cognition).

Question: Which are the three kinds of proofs?

Answer: Perception, Inference and Valid Testimony are the three kinds of proofs. These three are the generally accepted popular forms of proofs. A philosophical system is expounded for the benefit of common mass of people because they alone benefit from it. The intuitive knowledge of yogins who have transcended earthly things, is not in any way helpful to the understanding of ordinary man; hence it is not treated here though it truly exits.

Objection: Let it be so. The number of proofs may not be less than three; but why should it not be more than three? Others (like Gautama) indeed speak of more *pramāṇas* such as Analogy (*upamāna*) and the rest.

Reply: *Because in these three, all other proofs are included,* ie all other forms of proofs are included in these three, viz, Perception, Inference and Valid Testimony. This will be explained later on.

Question: The express purpose of the Scripture is to establish the provables. Then, why should the scripture define the proofs as *common* and *Special?*

Answer: 'Because apprehension of provables is possible only through proofs.' Here *siddhiḥ* (in the text) means *apprehension.*

The explanation of the *Kārikā* follows the *order of sense* ignoring the sequence of words (following the practise by respectable elders).

Now, while defining the special proof, the author first of all defines *Perception* because, a) it is superior among proofs; b) other proofs like inference etc are dependent on it; and c) all parties are agreed with regard to its primacy.

प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टं त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।
तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकमाप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं तु ॥ ५ ॥

Dṛṣṭaṁ perception; *Prati-viṣāyādhyavasāyaḥ,* is the ascertainment of each respective object (by the senses); *anumānaṁ,* Inference; *trividham-ākhyātam,* is declared to be of three kinds; *tat,* that (ie inference) *liṅga-liṅgi-pūrvakam,* is preceded by a knowledge of the mark and of that of which it is the mark; *āptavacanam tu,* while valid testimony; *āpta śrutiḥ,* is the statement of trustworthy persons and the Vedas.

5. Perception is the ascertainment of each respective object by the senses. Inference is declared to be of three kinds and it is preceded by a knowledge of the middle term (*liṅga*) and major term (*liṅgi*) while valid testimony is the statement of trustworthy persons and the Veda.

In the sentence *Prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam,* the word *dṛṣṭam* (perception) indicates the thing defined (*lakṣya*); the rest of the sentence is the definition (*lakṣaṇa*). The word *lakṣaṇa* means the differentiation (of the thing defined) from things of the same class as well as from those of other class. The literal meaning may be explained as follows: *Viṣaya* (objects) are those which impinge on the cognition by impressing their own form upon cognition. Earth and other substances and pleasure and other feelings (like pain etc) are objects to us. But, in their subtle forms (*tanmātras*) they are not objects to us though they are objects to the Yogins and ascetics. *Prativiṣayam* denotes that which impinges upon each particular object, ie the sense organ. *Vṛtti* is contact with the object. Thus it stands for *the sense which is in contact with each object;* knowledge depending on that is *adhyavasāya.* It is cognition resulting from the operation of *Buddhi.* On the modification of the senses apprehending objects, when there takes place the subdual of the *tamas* of *Buddhi,* there takes place predominance of *sattva* - this is variously known as

cognition, sense modification, and knowledge (*adhyavasāya, Vṛtti* and *jñāna*). This much is *pramāṇa.* The favour that is rendered unto the sentient faculty (*cetanā*) is the fruit known as *Right Cognition;* (*Pramā*) it is *bodha,* awareness.

Indeed, the *buddhitattva* is unintelligent as it is derived from *prakṛti;* hence, its cognition (which is a function of the Buddhi) is also unintelligent, like a jar etc. Similarly, (other modifications) of the *Buddhi Tattva,* such as pleasure etc, also are unintelligent. But the *Puruṣa* unassociated with pleasure etc is the Sentient Principle. (Yet) He (ie *Puruṣa*) appears to possess cognition, pleasure etc by virtue of their shadows falling therein by the reflection of cognition, pleasure etc which really subsist in the *Buddhi Tattva.* This is how the intelligent principle (*Cetanā*) comes to be favoured (by *Buddhi*). *Buddhi* and its *adhyavasāya,* though unintelligent in themselves, appear as though intelligent due to their being reflected in the intelligence (of the Spirit). This will be described in *Kārikā.-20*

By using the term *adhyavasāya* (in the text), *doubtful cognition* (*Saṁśaya*) is excluded, as *doubt* is of the nature of uncertainty and is, therefore, never definite whereas *adhyavasāya* is a definite cognition. The use of the term *Viṣaya* (object) obviates *perverse cognition (Viparyaya)* of things that do not exist. By using the term *prati* (in the text) the contact of the sense organ with an object is indicated; by this, inference, remembrance, etc get excluded. Thus, *ascertainment of each respective object through the contact of the senses* is the complete definition of perception as it excludes all things of the same kind as well as things of other kind. Definitions provided by philosophers belonging to other systems have not been either defended or criticised for fear of prolixity.

The *Lokāyatika* (materialist) says that Inference is not a means of cognition (*Pramāṇa*). If it is so, how does one know if the person (he was addressing) was ignorant, or in doubt, or

perverse? Certainly, it is not possible to an ordinary person whose perception is gross, to perceive the ignorance, doubt and perversity of another person; nor can it be known by any other means, because the materialist does not accept any other means (except direct perception). Thus, if, without knowing whether the person addressed is ignorant, or in doubt or perverse, the materialist were to go about addressing any and every person at random, certainly, such a person would be ignored as his expression is not fit to be heeded by all intelligent persons, as if he were mad. The ignorance, etc of another person has to be inferred only from such signs as the difference in his intention or words. Thus, he has to accept inference as a *pramāṇa* though he is unwilling.

It is just right that *inference* should be defined after first defining *perception* as *Inference* results from *Perception.* Also, inasmuch as the general definition must precede special definition, the author provides general definition of *Inference* by saying: *'It is preceded by a knowledge of the middle term and the major term.' The middle term (liṅga)* indicates the *pervaded* (*vyāpya* ie less extensive) while the *major term (liṅgi)* implies pervasiveness (*vyāpaka* - more extensive). *Vyāpya* is that whose natural concomittance (with *liṅgi*) has been duly established after all suspected and assumed (casual) adjuncts have been rejected. That with which the *liṅga* is concomitant is the *Vyāpaka* (the more extensive, major term). The words *middle term* and *major term* though are denotive of *objects* (of cognition), yet, here they stand for *cognition of those objects.* (Inference is) preceded by the cognition of smoke etc as *vyāpya* (in the inference 'Hill is fiery because of the presence of smoke') and fire etc as the *vyāpaka.* The term *liṅgi* has to be repeated and taken in the sense of that in which the *liṅga* is present, that is, by this the cognition that the *liṅga* (which is smoke here, the middle term) is present in the *minor term* (*pakṣa* which is *hill* in the above inference) arises.

(This is *pakṣa-dharmatājñāna*). Thus, the general definition of *Inference* is as follows: 'Inference is that cognition which is preceded (a) by the cognition of invariable concomitance between the major term and the middle term (ie *vyāptijñāna* between *liṅgi* and *liṅga*) and (b) by the cognition of the presence of the middle term (*liṅga*) in the minor term (*pakṣadharmatājñāna*).

The author by saying *Inference is declared to be of three kinds,* recalls the special forms of Inference described by another philosophical system (*Nyāya*). Inference which has just been defined in its general form, has three special forms, known as (a) Ap*riori-pūrvavat;* (b) *Aposteriori - Śeṣavat;* (c) based on general observation - *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.*

First of all, *inference* is of two kinds: *Vīta,* positive and *Avīta,* negative. Positively postulating *Inference* cognised through the method of agreement is the *vīta* while the negative *inference* got through the method of difference is *avīta.*

Of these two, the *avīta inference* is called *śeṣavat* (*aposteriori,* ie infering the cause - *kāraṇa* through the effect, *kārya*); *Śeṣa* is that which remains, the residue; hence the inference which has the *residue* for its subject matter is the *śeṣavat inference.* It has thus been described (in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1.1.5); 'The *śeṣavat inference* is that in which, with regard to an object, some of the likely properties being denied and eliminated, and there being no likehood of their belonging to some others, we have the cognition of that which remains (undenied and uneliminated).' An example of *avīta inference* got through the negative method will be cited later on (under Kārikā - 9).

Vīta inference is two fold (a) *Apriori - Pūrvavat* and (b) *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* - based on general observation. Of these, *Pūrvavat* has for its object that *Universal* of which a particular individual has previously been seen; *Pūrva* (in *Pūrvavat*) means

well known ie that *universal* of which the *particular individual* has previously been seen; thus, the *Inferential Cognition* of which such a *universal* is the object is called *Pūrvavat;* for example, the presence of the particular *universal fire* in the mountain is inferred from the presence of smoke (in the mountain). Here, the *universal fire* is one of which a particular individual in the form of a *specific fire* has previously been seen in the hearth. The second form of *vīta* inference is the *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa,* which has for its object *universal instances* of which some kind have not previously been seen, eg the inferential cognition which has senses as its object (ie cognition of the sense organ). What is inferred in this case is the instrumentality of an organ bringing about by its action the cognition of colour and such things. (Inference of cause - *Kāraṇa* through the *Kārya* - effect). Though instrumentality (*Karaṇatva* the capability of effecting an act) as a *genus (sāmānya)* is a known thing, because the specific individual is seen in the axe which is an instrument of cutting, that particular instrument (*Indriya*) which brings about the cognition of colour, etc is only inferred because the particular individual of that instrument (which brings about the cognition of colour etc) has never been perceived: That (particular form) of *instrument (Karaṇa)* is that which is regarded as belonging to the *universal sense organ* and any *specific individual* of that universal sense organ (*indriyatva-sāmānyasya*) is not perceptible to persons of ordinary vision as in the case of the *specific individual fire* being seen of the *universal fire.* This is what distinguishes the *Pūrvavat inference* from the *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference,* though both are equally *Vīta* inference. In the term *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* the word *dṛṣṭa* signifies cognition (*darśana*) of the universal (*sāmānyasya*); the tasil affix is capable of signifying the sense of all case-endings; thus the term *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* stands for the inferential cognition of that particular universal of which a specific individual has not been perceived. All this has been fully

described by us in the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatīkā* and as such is not repeated here for fear of being prolix.[1]

The disciple, immediately after hearing his teacher utter some words, (such as *bring a cow* etc) acts in a certain manner (brings the cow). The person witnessing this infers from the above that the understanding of the sense of words uttered by the teacher is the cause of action by the student. From this he recognises the connection between the words used and their meaning. Further, this recognition of connection between the word and its meaning is the thing that helps a word in expressing its meaning. From this it follows the Verbal Testimony is preceded by inference; consequently, Valid Verbal Testimony is defined after Inference. It is defined as 'Statements made by trustworthy persons and the Vedas.' Here *āptavacana* indicates the *thing to be defined* while the rest of the sentence indicates its *definition.* The word *āpta* means that which is right; that which is right and also a revelation (*śruti*) is *āptaśrutiḥ* thus, *śruti* stands for that cognition of meaning of a sentence which is brought about by that sentence.

Valid Testimony is self-authoritative, ie it is always right inasmuch as it is brought about by the words of the Vedas which are not authored by any human being and because it is therefore free from all defects (such as falsehood which render words unreliable). It is for this same reason that the knowledge derived from the *smṛti,itihāsa* and *purāṇa* (canonical work, historical narrations and myths) is also regarded as *right* because they have

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1. A sense-organ does not belong to the same class as an axe, the instrumentality of which is seen in cutting etc. Further, a sense organ is also not an object of perception. Now, cognition and action are acts, the act of cutting cannot be effected without an instrument; similarly, the act of cognition and action too cannot be effected without some instrument. Thus is inferred the existence of the *Indriyas* as the instruments of cognition and action.

the Vedas as their source. As regards the Primeval sage Kapila, (the founder of the Sāṇkhya philosophical system) it is probable that he remembered the Vedic texts that he had studied during the previous *Kalpas* (time cycles), just as the knowledge of things gained on the previous day is remembered the next day on waking up from sleep. And this is evident from the statement made by the venerable Jaigīṣavya in the text: 'While I was evolving during ten *Kalpas*' etc where he speaks of his past lives extending over a period of ten *kalpas,* (time cycles) during a conversation between him and *Āvaṭya.* By using the word *Āpta,* (in *āptavacana*) all such *pseudo-revelations* as the improper scriptures of the Buddists, (*Sākyabhikṣu*), Jains (*nirgraṅthaka*) and materialists (*Saṁsāramocaka*) are excluded. All these (above mentioned scriptures) are just *not worthy* (*ayuktatvam*) because of (a) inconsistency, (b) being deviod of sound basis, (c) contradictory to reason and (d) as they are accepted only by a few low and beastlike persons such as Mlecchas etc. By the particle *tu* in the text the author distinguishes *Valid Verbal Testimony* from *Inference.* The *meaning of a sentence* is verily the *object cognised* (by means of that very sentence); but it does not become its property (dharma) by which it could become its *liṅga* (ie inferential indication, as *smoke* is of *fire*). Nor is there any need to have a prior knowledge of *connection* (between the sentence and its meaning) in order to express the meaning of that sentence. (This is seen) In the work of a new poet where though the sentence used by the poet was never heard before, yet it expresses a meaning that was never cognised as having been expressed before.

Thus, this (as described above) being the nature of definitions of both the general and special forms of proofs, all other proofs such as *Analogy* and the rest which have been posited by the opponents (ie other philosophical systems) are included in the very proofs defined above.

For instance, the statements *As is the cow, so is Gavaya* is cited as an example of *Analogy.* The notion brought about by this means is verily a verbal cognition. Also the notion arising (from the above statement) that the word *Gavaya* denotes all animal *similar* to a cow, is only a case of *inferential cognition.* Here, the *inference* takes the following form: 'When a particular word is used by (knowledgeable) elderly persons (with reference to a particular thing) it should be regarded as denoting it when there is no other function (than *direct denotation*), as found in the example of the word *cow* denoting its generic attribute *cowness* as well. In a similar way, the elders use the word *Gavaya* to denote an *animal similar to the cow.* Therefore, the word *Gavaya* must be considered as denotative of that animal. This cognition is thus purely inferential. Further, the notion that the animal *Gavaya* which is before our eyes is similar to the *Cow* is purely a perceptional cognition. That is why when the *cow* is remembered, the cognition of its similarity to *Gavaya* arises and this is nothing but pure perception. Certainly, the *resemblance* in the *cow* is not something different from that in the *Gavaya.* Again, that is known as *resemblance* when the aggregate of the component parts of the body of one animal (like tails, hooves etc found in the genus of cow) is found to a great extent to be similar to that in the body of another animal. This *resemblance* of aggregates (of certain characteristics in the two animals of that *genus*) is one only; So, when it has been perceived in the *Gavaya* it must be so in *cow* also. Thus, there is nothing left to be the object of a different means of cognition in the form of *Analogy.* (Because, as proved above, every cognition arising from analogy is found to be either Perceptional or Inferential or Verbal). Thus we affirm that *Analogy* is not a distinct means of cognition.

Similarly, *Presumption* (*Arthāpatti*) also is not a seperate *pramāṇa.* In support of *Presumption* as a distinct *pramāṇa,* the ancients have put forward the following example: 'Chaitra who is

alive is not seen in the house.' Here, the existence of Chaitra somewhere else is cognised by means of *presumption* though he is not seen in the house (according to ancients). As a matter of fact, this too is a case of inference. With regard to one's own body, the concomitance is easily recognised as when we know that an existing finite object which is not present in one place is present in another place, and also that when a finite object is present in one place, it is not present in another place. Therefore, with the help of the minor premise that *the living Chaitra is not at home* we get the understanding (or we infer) that he must be somewhere *outside the house.* So, this is a clear case of inference. The presence of *Chaitra somewhere in the world* cannot set aside the fact of his *absence in the house;* inasmuch as the unestablished *absence in the house* cannot be a valid reason for *his presence outside the house.* Nor does Chaitra's *absence in his house* negate his very existence. It is only if his existence itself were denied, that it is not possible to establish his existence outside the house.

Doubt: Is Chaitra's *non-existence in the house* inconsistent with his *existence itself* or only with *his existence in the house?*

Answer: It cannot be the former, because there can be no inconsistency between *existence somewhere else* and *non-existence in the house,* because, the two things are quite independent of each other.

Objection: *House* is also included in *space in general.* (The contention that there is no inconsistency between *non-existence in the house* and *existence somewhere else* as they are two different things is being contradicted). Therefore, (Chaitra's existence somewhere else) implies his *existence in the house* also; here, the subject matter being the same, there would be inconsistency between *existence somewhere else* and *non-existence in the house.*

Answer: This is not so. *Non-existence in the house* which is determined by *Pramāṇa* (means of right cognition) cannot be negated by doubtful and implied notion of *existence in the house* (by such dubious arguments as *house also is included in space in general.*). Though, the definitely determined *non-existence in the house* sets aside the dubious and implied notion of *existence in the house,* it cannot deny *man's* existence; nor can it remove the doubt (regarding the possibility of *existence in the house* implied by the opponent). What is negated is only his *existence in the house* by *Chaitra's non-existence as delimited by the house* because of incompatibility (of *existence* with *non-existence*); his existence in general is not negated because of neutrality (ie there is no incompatibility). Therefore, an inference of *Man's existence outside* is drawn from the ascertained reason (*liṅga* or middle term) in the form of his *non-existence in the house.* The above reason also removes another definition of *Presumption* as consisting in *the removal of contrariness between two valid cognitions by restricting them to distinct subject matters;* because in reality there is no inconsistency between *what is delimited* and *what is not delimited* (ie between *non-existence in the house* and *existence somewhere else*). Other examples of *presumption* ought to be similarly included in *inference.* By this it is established that *Presumption* is not a separate *pramāṇa* distinct from *Inference.*

Similarly, *Non-existence* (*abhāva*) also is only a form of *Perception.* The non-existence of a jar (at a certain place) is nothing but a particular modification of the place (where the existence of the jar is denied) as characterised by *absoluteness.* Except the Sentient Principle, all other entities undergo modifications every moment and all these diverse modifications are perceptible to the senses. Hence there can be no object which could be the subject of a distinct means of cognition like *abhāva* (non-existence).

Saṁbhava (equivalence) which leads to the cognition of lesser weights such as *Droṇa, ādhaka,* and *Prastha,* (as included) in (the greater weight) *khāri,* is also a form of *inference* only (and not a separate *pramāṇa*). In fact, the notion that the greater weight of *khāri* is inclusive of *Droṇa* etc leads to the cognition of presence of lesser weight like *Droṇa* in *khāri.* (*Khāri* is a measure equal to 16 *Droṇas*).

Legend—*aitihya* is merely a continuity of a vague statement originating from (a dubious) unnamed source, generally appearing in the form, 'ancients have said so and so.' An example of this is found in the statement: *On this banyan tree there lives a ghost.* Now, this cannot be a distinct *pramāṇa* because the statement is dubious as the source of its origin is undetermined. If the source of its origin is determined to be the statement of Trustworthy persons, then it is simply a case of Verbal Cognitioin. Thus, it is but fit and proper to say that *pramāṇas* are of three kinds only.

Thus have been defined the *pramāṇas* (proofs or means of cognition) in order to establish the existence of the *vyakta* (manifested), *avyakta* (unmanifested) and the *Jña* (*Puruṣa* - Spirit). Of these, the *manifested* in the form of earth and the rest, is known by means of direct perception even by a dusty-footed ploughman (ie even by an unlettered person). He also knows such things as Fire (in the hill) by means of *a priori inference* (*pūrvavat anumāna*) based upon the perception of such indicative marks as smoke etc. Therefore, the scripture would not be rendering any worth while help if it were to deal with only such things. The scriptures, therefore, should deal with things that are very difficult to know by ordinary means of knowledge. Accordingly, the author highlights (in the following verse) as to what *pramāṇas* among those mentioned earlier are capable of bringing about the knowledge of what things:

सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानात्।
तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात्सिद्धम्॥ ६॥

Tu, But; *atīndriyāṇāṁ pratītiḥ,* the knowledge of super-sensible things; *sāmānyataḥ dṛṣṭāt anumānāt,* (is obtained) through inference based on general observations; *Parokṣam,* super-sensible things; *tasmād api ca asiddham,* not established even by it; *āpta-āgamāt siddham,* is established by Testimony and Revealation.

6. But the knowledge of supersensible things is obtained through Inference based on general observation; and the knowledge of supersensible things not established even by that is established through Testimony and Revelation.

The particle *tu* (in the text) distinguishes *Inference based on general observation* from *perception and a priori inference* (*pūrvavat*). The knowledge of supersensible things such as *Pradhāna* (Primordial Matter) and *Puruṣa* (Spirit) and the rest is obtained through *Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* inference, that is to say, this knowledge is obtained due to certain operation of *Buddhi* in the form of its reflection in the cognitive Spirit. The mention of this particular inference is only illustrative; it should be regarded as inclusive of *śeṣavat* (a *posteriori*) inference also.

Objection: Is it then that cognition of all supersensible things is obtained only through the inference based on general observation? If it were so, then it would mean that things like Heaven, Unseen forces, Divinities, etc and also the order of evolution of *Mahat* and other principles, do not exist as in these cases the above inference is not applicable.

Answer: In answer to this, the text says: *tasmādapi*...etc. The use of the term *tasmāt* is enough to indicate the intention of their establishment; the additional use of particle *ca* is meant to include *a posteriori inference* also.

Objection: Let it be so. Now, the non-perception of such things as *skyflower* (*gagana-kusuma*), *tortoise hair* (*kūrma-roma*)

hare's horn (*śaśa-viṣāṇa*) etc leads to their being considered as non-existent. Similar is the case with regard to Primordial Nature etc. Then, how is it that their existence is established through inference such as *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa and others?*

The following verse is in answer to this:

अतिदूरात्सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
सौक्ष्म्यात् व्यवधानाभिभवात्समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ ७ ॥

Atidūrāt, from excessive distance; *sāmīpyāt,* from proximity; *indriyaghātāt,* from impairment of the senses; *mano'nava-sthānāt,* from absent mindedness; *saukṣmyāt,* from subtlety; *vyava-dhānāt,* from intervention; *abhibhavāt,* from suppression (by others); *samānābhihārāt,* and from intermixture with other similar objects; *ca* and others.

7. (Apprehension of even existing things does not arise) through excessive distance, proximity, impairment of senses, absentmindedness, subtlety, intervention, suppression by other objects, intermixture with other similar objects, and other causes.

Anupalabdhiḥ - (*non-perception*) occuring in the next *kārikā* should be read retrospectively (with this *kārikā*) following the maxim of *Lion's Glance.*[2] A bird soaring very high in the sky (though existing) is not perceived by the eye due to excessive distance. The term *ati* (in the text) should be read with *sāmīpya* (proximity) also. The collyrium applied to the eye is not perceived (though it is present) due to close proximity. *Impairment of organs* indicates blindness, deafness etc. *Absent-mindedness* is like one not perceiving things even in bright day-light,

2. *Simhāvalokana Nyāya* is the maxim of a lion's backward and forward glance. The lion has the habit of looking in front and behind after killing his prey to see if there is any rival to dispute possession. This maxim is generally used when one casts a retrospective glance at what has been left behind while at the same time he is going ahead with his work.

though they are in contact with the senses, because the mind is overcome by strong passion and other emotions. *From subtlety* it is the inability to perceive things like atom etc however much one may concentrate one's mind on it and though they may be very near one's faculty. *From intervention* it is like one not seeing the queen and other persons (though existent) they being obstructed (concealed) by a wall. *From suppression* it is like one not seeing the planets and stars during the day because they are suppressed by the brighter rays of the sun. *From intermixture* it is like not perceiving the drops of water released from clouds in a tank (where they mingle). The particle *ca* (in the *Kārikā*) has a collective force and includes even those not mentioned (in the *kārikā*). By this, even the *unmanifested* gets included (among the causes for non-perception) like the curd not being perceived as it is unmanifest in the state of milk.

What is meant by all this is that a thing does not become non-existent just because it is not directly perceived; for, there is a danger of the argument being unwarrantably stretched too far. For example, a man, going out of his house, would then conclude that the people in his house are non-existent just because he does not see them. But it is not so. The non-existence is determined of only such things which have the capability of being perceived but are not perceived at the time. Primordial nature, Spirit and the rest do not possess the property of being perceived and it is not proper for intelligent men to infer from this that they are non-existent just because they are not perceived. The question as to which of the above mentioned causes applied to the non-perception of Primordial Nature and others, is answered in the following *Kārikā:*

सौक्ष्म्यातदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात्कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः ।
महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च ॥ ८ ॥

Tatanupalabdhiḥ, Its non-perception; *saukṣmyāt,* is because of its

subtlety; *na abhāvāt,* not because of its non-existence; *kāryataḥ,* through its effects; *tat upalabdheḥ,* as it is apprehended; *tat ca kāryam,* and its effect is; *Mahat ādi,* and the rest; *prakṛti-sarūpam,* similar to Prakṛti; *virūpam ca,* and dissimilar.

8. Its non-perception is due to its subtlety and not due to its non-existence. It is apprehended through its effects; these effects are the Mahat (Great Principle) and the rest; some of them are similar and some are dissimilar to Prakṛti (the Primordial Matter).

Why not we say that these are not apprehended only because of their non-existence, just like the seventh kind of *rasa?*[3]

The author answers: *Na-abhāvāt:* not because of its non-existence; why? *because it is apprehended through its effects. Tat* (in the text) refers to *Primordial Nature.* The proof for the apprehension of the *Spirit* is given (in Kārikā-17) as follows: *the aggregate must be for the sake of non-aggregate.* When we find that direct sense perception does not apprehend objects whose existence is proved by stronger proofs, it is to be understood that the senses are incapable of apprehension. The non-apprehension of *seventh taste* by the senses cannot be attributed to the incapability of the senses to apprehend it; it is because its (ie of the *seventh taste*) existence has not been established by any valid proof.

Question: What again, are the effects from which the existence of Primordial Nature is inferred?

Answer: *Mahat and the rest are its effects.* Details of how they indicate (the existence of *Pradhāna*) will be explained later on (in Kārikā 22). The statement in the text: *Similar and dissimilar to Nature* is mentioned because a comprehension of similarity and dissimilarity of these effects is helpful in gaining

3. I.e., Tastes are only six; they are: *Kaṭu,* pungent, *Āmla,* acidic; *Madhura,* sweet; *Lavaṇa,* saltish; *Tikta,* bitter; and *Kaṣāya,* astringent. Therefore, the *rasas* being only six, the seventh kind of *rasa* is non-existent.

discriminative wisdom (*Viveka Jñāna*). This will further be classified (in Kārikā 23 etc).

The cause alone is apprehended through the effects. With regard to this (subject of cause and effect) there are different versions among different philosophers.

(1) Some say (Buddists assert) that *existent* (effect) emanates from the *non-existent* (cause); (2) Others (Advaitins) affirm that all effects are merely illusory appearances of One Reality and are not real entities by themselves. (3) Others (like Kaṇāda and Gautama) hold that the (previously) *non-existent effect* (arises) from the *existent cause;* and lastly, (4) the ancients (like Kapila) declare that *existent* (effect) emanates from the existent (cause). Under the first three of the opinions (about the theory of cause and effect), the existence of *Pradhāna* (Primordial Nature) cannot be proved. The world is of the nature of sound and other elements which are only different modifications of pleasure, pain and delusion. This proves that the cause of the world is *Pradhāna* which is of the nature of the attributes of *Sattwa, Rajas* and *Tamas* (which are of the essence of pleasure, pain and delusion *sukha, duhkha, and moha* respectively). If the argument *'that the existent effect is* produced from *the non-existent cause'* is accepted, then, how could the non-existent Cause which must be inexpressible as it is characterless, be of the nature of Sound etc? Certainly, the non-existent can never be of the nature of existent. Even if it be said that the world of the nature of sound etc is an illusory appearance of One Reality, then also it cannot be proved that the existent effect is produced from the existent cause. Nor can the One Reality without a second ever constitute the phenomenality; rather, the conception of the non-phenomenal as constituting the phenomenal is only an illusion. Even under the theory of Kaṇāda and Gautama, that the non-existent effect is born of existent cause, it cannot be considered that the effect is entirely constituted by the cause as there could be no identity

between the existent and the non-existent; hence under this theory also, the existence of *Pradhāna* cannot be established.

Therefore, in order to establish the existence of *Pradhāna,* the author at the outset declares that the *effect is existent.*

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत् कार्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

Asat akaraṇāt, from the non-effectuation of the non-existent; *upādānagrahaṇāt,* from the selection of material for the effect; *sarva sambhava abhāvāt,* from the absence of the production of everything by every means; *śaktasya,* of the competent; *śakyakaraṇāt,* from the effectuation of the producible; *ca,* and; *kāraṇabhāvāt,* from the effect being of the same essence as cause; *sat kāryam,* the effect is existent.

9. The effect is ever existent, because (1) what is non-existent can by no means be brought into existence; (2) because effects take adequate material cause; (3) because all effects are not producible from all causes; (4) because an efficient cause can produce only that for which it is efficient; and finality, (5) because the effect is of the same essence as the cause.

Satkāryam (in the text) means that the *effect is existent* even before the operation of the cause. The Naiyāyikā-s should not raise the objection (against this doctrine) by saying that it suffers from the absurdity of *establishing what is already established.*[4] Even though products like the *sprout* and the *jar* are found to be produced after the *destruction* of the *seed* and *lump of clay* takes place, it cannot be said by this that the causal efficacy belongs to *destruction* (*pradhvamsa* as it is a pure negation); causal efficacy belongs only to positive entities consisting

4. This is known as *siddha sādhana doṣa;* it means that if the effect is already existent, then the operation of the cause to bring into existence that effect is superfluous.

of component particles of the *seed* (and *lump of clay*). If it were possible that a *positive entity* is produced from mere *negation,* then, such negation being easily available everywhere, the absurd possibility that all things could be produced at all places would arise.[5] All this has been explained in full by us in the Nyāya vārtika-tātparyaṭīkā.

(The Vedāntic theory) that the phenomenal world is merely an illusory appearance cannot be justified unless we have some proofs to invalidate its existence. Now remains the theory of Gautama and Kaṇāda (that the previously non-existent effect evolves from the existent cause). Here, the author establishes his view that the *effect is existent.* The reasons for this assertion are given (in the text): (1) *What is non-existent can by no means be produced:* If the effect were non-existent before the operation of the cause, then it could never be brought into existence by anybody; for, not even thousands of artists can ever change blue (colour) to yellow. If it be said that *existence* and *non-existence* were mere properties (*dharma*) belonging to the jar, even then, the object being non-existent, there can be no property subsisting in it, and the *existence* of the jar remains even as it was; and also non-existence cannot be the property of the jar because if the *non-existence* is not connected to and not identical with the jar, how could the jar be regarded as non-existent? Hence it follows that effect must be existent before the causal operation also, even as it exists after the causal operation. This being so, what is expected of a cause is only the manifestation of pre-existing effect. It is quite appropriate to affirm that the latent effect manifests, for example, the manifestation of oil from sesamum seeds by applying pressure, of rice from paddy by thumping, and of milk from cows by milking. But we have no such instance to

5. Through this the first theory of the Buddhists that the *existent effect emanates from the non-existent cause* is refuted.

prove the production of a non-existent thing. In fact what is *non-existent* is never found to be either manifested or produced.

For the following reasons also the effect should be taken as subsisting in the cause even before its operation: *because of the selection of the material for the effect.* The term *upādāna;* (in the text) stands for the cause; and *grahaṇa* (in the text) means *grahaṇa* of cause and stands for its relation to the effect. The compound *upādānagrahaṇāt* therefore means *'because there is definite relation of the cause with the effect.'* The meaning is that the cause produces the effect only when it is related to that effect; there could be no such relation with the effect if it were non-existent. Therefore, effect must be regarded as existent.

Question: Let it be so. Even then, why not the effects be produced from causes not related to them? In such a case, it could be that *non-existent effect* alone is produced. This is answered by the text '*sarvasambhava abhāvāt* - because of absence of production of everything from everything.' If it is said that an effect could be produced without being related to the cause, then, every effect could arise from every cause as all would be equally unrelated to the cause; but such a thing never happens. Hence an unrelated effect cannot be produced by an unrelated cause but only a related effect can be produced by a related cause. That is why Sāṅkhya teachers assert: 'Causes which are always related to existent things, can have no connection with non-existent things; for one who desires the production of an unrelated effect there would be no restriction, (ie there would be indiscriminate production of things).'

Objection: Let it be so; but the cause, even though unrelated, is capable of producing only that effect for which it is efficient; and this efficiency of the cause is apprehended by actually seeing the effect being produced. Thus, there can be no disorderliness, (as mentioned above). This is answered by the text: *'because the efficient cause can only produce that for which it is efficient.'*

Now, does this efficiency (*śakti*) subsist in the efficient cause operative on all things or only on that effect which it is efficient to bring forth? If the former is accepted, then, the same confusion of disorderliness arises; if the latter, then it has to be explained as to how it can operate on a *non-existent* thing. If it be said that the causal efficacy (*śakti*) itself is constituted in such a way that it can produce only certain effects and not all effects, we ask, well, is this peculiarly constituted efficiency of yours related to the particular effect or not? If related, then no relation is possible with what is *non-existent;* so, the effect has to be accepted as *existent.* If not related, we have again the same problem of *avyavasthā,* disorderliness. Therefore, rightly has it been said (in the text) 'that the efficient cause can produce only that for which it is efficient.' Further, the reason for regarding the effect as existent is being given by the statement *'because the effect is of the same essence as the cause.'* Effect is of the same essence as the cause: so, effect cannot be different from the cause. Therefore, the cause being existent, how can the effect which is non-different from the cause, be non-existent?

The following are the proofs that establish the non-difference of the effect from the cause: (1) The cloth is not different from the yarns (constituting it) because the cloth subsists in the yarns. A thing differing in its essence from another, cannot subsist in it, like a cow in a horse; but here, the cloth subsists in its yarns. From this it follows that the effect is not different from its cause. (2) The cloth and the yarn cannot be two different things because of the relationship between the material cause and the effect (*upādāna-upādeya bhāva*). Whenever two things are found to be different from each other, there the relationship between the constituent cause and effect is never found, eg in the case of the jar and the cloth. But the relationship between the constituent cause and the effect is found between the yarn and the

cloth; thus the two are not different things. (3) For the following reason also cloth and yarn are not two different things: 'because there is neither conjunction nor disjunction between them (*saṁyoga-aprāpti abhāvāt*).' Conjunction is found to exist only between objects different from each other, as between the well and the jujubee tree; the same with regard to seperation also, as between the Himavān and the Vindhyā. In case of the cloth and the yarns, there is no such conjunction or disjunction; hence, they are not two different things. (4) For the following reason also, the cloth does not differ from the yarns because the cloth does not contain in itself any other product which makes it heavier than the yarns. In fact, it is only in an object that differs in essence from another that a different product with greater weight is accepted; eg the lowering of the balance caused by a bracelet weighing two *pālas* is more than that caused by the bracelet weighing a single *pāla.* But no such difference is seen between the effect of the weight of the cloth and the effect of the weight of the yarns. Therefore, the cloth is not different from the yarns. These proofs establishing the non-difference between the cloth and the yarns are afforded by *avīta inference* (negative inference).

Thus the non-difference between the cloth and the yarns is established. It follows, therefore, that the cloth is only the yarns arranged in different fashions and that the cloth is non-different from the yarns in its essence. Nor can it be established that the two are entirely different from each other by such arrguments as: (a) In a non-different thing, there would occur self-contradictory actions (ie when the *cloth* is torn and reduced to *threads* it involves the action of being destroyed on the part of the *cloth* and the action of being produced on the part of the *threads* or *yarns;* if the identity of the *cloth* and *yarn* is accepted then it would thus involve self-contradictory actions like *destruction and production.*). (b) The knowledge that the cause and effect are related

(leads to the notion that the two members of the relation are different); and (c) the purpose of the function of the cause is different from that served by the effect (eg the cloth serves the purpose of covering things, which purpose cannot be served by the yarns). These arguments cannot establish the difference between the cause and the effect, because all the above mentioned oppositions can be explained and reconciled by attributing the notions to the appearance and disappearance of certain factors; (1) The limbs of the tortoise *disappear* when they enter into its body; and appear again when the limbs are drawn out. Because of this, it cannot be said that the limbs are produced and destroyed by the tortoise. In similar way, the jar, and the crown etc are only some particular modifications of the selfsame clay, gold and so forth; they are said to be produced when they *appear* (ie emerge) from clay or gold and said to be destroyed when they disappear by entering into them again (ie when they become again clay, gold etc). In reality, there can be no *production* for what is *non-existent* and no *destruction* for what is *existent.* This has been declared to be so by Bhagavān Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana (in Bhagavad Gītā 2.16): 'There is no *being* for the non-existent nor *non-being* for the existent.' In the example quoted, the tortoise is not different from its *appearing* and *disappearing* limbs; similarly, the jar, the crown and other products also are not different from clay, gold etc.

(2) The significations (of difference between the cloth and the yarns) implicit in such statements as 'the cloth is in these yarns' (ie the cloth is made up of these yarns) is like the statement: 'These are Tilaka trees in the forest.' (Here, this statement does not mean that the forest is different from the Tilaka trees; rather the forest is nothing but the aggregate of Tilaka trees. Similarly, in the example of the cloth and yarns also, the cloth is but the yarns in a particular form; in essence *there is no difference between the two*).

(3) The difference in the functions of purpose served by them also cannot establish the difference between the cause and the effect; because, one and the same thing is found to have several different purposes. For example, fire, though one only, yet serves different purposes like *burning, cooking and lighting.* Nor can it be said that variations of functions is the cause of differences; because, it is seen that the functions of the same thing vary with their operating collectively or individually; for example, each individual bearer performs only the function of pointing out the way and not that of carrying the palanquin. But collectively they perform the function of carrying the palanquin. In like manner, yarns do not serve the purpose of covering when they are scattered severally; but, joining together and thus appearing in the form of cloth, they serve the purpose of covering.

Objection: Now, *was this appearance* (ie coming into being of the cloth) existent before the causal operation? or was it non-existent? If it was non-existent, then the *production* of what was *non-existent,* has to be admitted. If it was existent (before the operation of the cause), then, where is the necessity for causal operation? For, we do not see any necessity for causal operation when the effect is already there. If it is said that though this manifestation is existent, yet it is the manifestation of this manifestation for which causal operation is needed, it only lands us in an endless series of *manifestations* (which is absurd). Therefore, it is hollow to argue that what all happens when a cloth is produced is just that the yarns become manifested in the form of cloth.

Answer: We reply: This is not so. If according to your opinion, a non-existent effect is produced, then, tell us, what is this production of non-existent effect? Is it existent or non-existent? If it is existent, then where is the need for the cause? If it is non-existent, then there should be production of that

production also, and thus there would be an endless series of productions (which is obsurd and unacceptable). (To avoid this defect) if it be said that *production* is not some thing different from the cloth but verily the cloth itself, then it would mean that the utterance of the term *cloth* is synonymous with the utterence of the term *is produced.* In which case, when the term *cloth* is uttered, the term *is produced* should not be uttered because, (these two being synonymous) the utterence of the term *is produced* would only be a needless repetition. Also, one cannot say, the cloth *is destroyed* because both production and destruction can never coexist in one and the same thing.

Therefore, this *production of cloth* must consist either in *inherence* (of the cloth) *in its cause (sva-kāraṇa-samavāya),* or inherence (of the cloth) in its *Being* (*sva sattā samavāya*). In either of these, the said *production* is *not produced* (because *inherence* is eternal). Even so, for the purpose of that *production,* several causes must become operative. Thus it is appropriate to say that there is a need for causes to bring about the manifestation of the already existent products like the cloth etc. Again it is not that the causes are related to the *form* of the cloth, because, the *form* is not an *operation;* it is only to an *operation* that the causes are related, as otherwise, (ie if the causes are not related to operation) they would not be *causes* at all. Thus it has been amply proved that the *effect is ever existent* (*satkāryam*).

Thus, having proved that the *effect* is *existent,* which fact is helpful in proving the existence of *Pradhāna,* the author, in order to show the means of proving the existence of *Pradhāna,* next states the similarity and dissimilarity between the *manifested* (*vyakta*) and the *unmanifested* (*avyakta*), a proper comprehension of which is conducive to *vivekajñāna* (discriminative wisdom), in the next kārikā:

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

Vyaktam, The Manifested; *hetumat,* is possessing or depending upon a cause; *anityam,* non-eternal; *avyāpi,* not pervasive, ie finite; *sakriyam,* mobile or active; *anekam,* manifold; *āśritam,* supported or dependant; *liṅgam,* mergent, mark; *sāvayavam,* made up of parts; *paratantram,* subordinate; *avyaktam,* the unmanifested; *viparītam,* is the reverse (of the above).

10. The manifested is producible, non-eternal, non-pervasive, active, multiform, dependant, serving as a mark (of inference), aggregate of parts and subordinate. The Unmanifest is the reverse of this.

The manifest is with the cause (ie it is a product). The question as to what is the cause of what is being dealt with later (in Kārikā 22). *Anityam* is destructible, ie subject to disappearance (in its material cause). *Non-pervasive,* because it does not pervade all its evolutes. It is only the effect that is pervaded by the cause, not the cause by the effect. For instance, *Buddhi* (intelligence) and other products can never pervade *Pradhāna;* as such they are *non-pervasive. Active,* because of mobility like entering and exiting; *Buddhi* and other evolutes are regarded mobile, because they give up the body they had occupied earlier and occupy another body. Mobility of body, earth and other substances is well-known. *Manifold,* because *Buddhi* and other evolutes differ with each person (ie there are as many of them as there are persons). Earth and other evolutes too are multitudinous according to differences in bodies, jars and other products. *Dependant*-because they are supported by their respective causes. Though the evolutes like the *Buddhi* and the rest are non-different from their cause, yet, assuming some sort of difference, they are connected to the cause in the relation of the *support* and *the supported,* as found in the statement 'There are Tilaka trees in the

forest.' (Here, trees have no existence apart from that of the forest).

Liṅgam, ie the *mark of Pradhāna. Buddhi* and other products are the *marks* of *Pradhāna* (*Primordial Matter*). This will be explained later (under Kārikā-15 etc). But *Pradhāna* is not the mark of *Pradhāna* itself though it may be regarded to be so of the *Spirit. Sāvayavam*-ie containing in itself the relation of the whole and the parts; or, the term *avayava* may be explained as equivalent to *avayavana,* which means mutual adhesion, ie *conjunction* between the *whole* and the *parts. Conjunction* consists in *union* following *disunion. Sāvayavam* is therefore that which has such contact. For instance, substances like the earth etc conjoin mutually. Similarly, other substances too conjoin. But *Pradhāna* does not conjoin with (its products) *Buddhi* and the rest, because they are non-different (ie they are essentially one with *Pradhāna*). Nor is there any mutual conjunction among the attributes of *Sattwa, Rajas* and *Tamas,* because there is the absence of disunion among them.

Paratantram: *Buddhi* and the rest are the subordinates. In order to produce its evolute, *ahaṁkāra* (the I-Principle), *Buddhi* needs the assistance of *Prakṛti* in the form of infilling it. Without such assistance, *Buddhi,* being weak, won't be able to produce *ahaṁkāra.* Similarly, *ahaṁkāra* and the rest too need the assistance of *Prakṛti* in producing their evolutes. Thus everything requires the infilling of *Prakṛti* for evolving its products. Therefore, even though efficient in producing its own evolutes, the assistance of the Supreme Nature (*Param Prakṛti*) by way of infilling them is needed. Therefore, the Manifest is dependent.

The *Unmanifest* is the reverse of the *Manifest.* That is to say, the *Unmanifest* is *without cause, eternal, pervasive* and *inactive.* Even though the *Unmanifest* possesses the activity of evolution, yet, there is no mobility in it. The Unmanifest is

therefore one, not a component, non-mergent, unconjunct and independent.

By this, the dissimilarities between the Manifested and the Unmanifested have been explained. Now, the author states the similarities between them and their dissimalarities from the Spirit in the following verse:

त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ ११ ॥

Vyaktam, The Manifest; *triguṇam,* is constituted of three attributes; *aviveki,* indistinguishable; *viṣayaḥ,* objective; *sāmānyaṁ,* common; *acetanaṁ,* non-intelligent; *prasavadharmi,* prolific; *Tathā,* so; *Pradhānam,* is the Primordial Nature; *Pumān,* the Spirit; *tadviparītaḥ* is the reverse of that; *ca tathā,* and also similar (in some respects).

11. The Manifest is constituted of the three attributes (of *Sattwa, Rajas* and *Tamas*), is non-distinguishable, objective, common, non-intelligent, and prolific. So also is the Primordial Nature. The Spirit is the reverse of both of them and yet is similar in some respects.

Three attributes: The Manifest is constituted of three attributes of *pleasure, pain* and *delusion* (which are the essence of *Sattwa, Rajas* and *Tamas* respectively). By this statement the theories of all those (Tārkikas and others) who hold that *pleasure* etc are the qualities inhering in the Spirit are refuted. Indistinguishable because just as *Pradhāna* cannot be distinguished from itself, so also *Mahat* and the rest cannot be distinguished from *Pradhāna,* because of their being identical with *Pradhāna;* or, indistinguisability may mean the characteristic of creating things by uniting together; because none of them is capable of evolving even its own product singly but only by uniting together. Thus, by itself, it is not possible for anything to produce anything out of anything.

Doubt: Some say (ie the *Vijñāna Vādins* belonging to the Yogācāra School of Buddhism) that pleasure, pain and delusion which are of the form of sound and other elements are nothing but mere *Ideas;* further, there can exist nothing besides this *Idea* that can have these as its attributes. To refute this, it is said *Viṣaya* (in the text), that is, the Manifest is objective. Objective is that which is *apprehended* by the senses and it is exterior to *Idea.* Because it is *objective,* it is also *Common* ie it is apprehended by all *puruṣas* alike. If it is said that it is only a form of *Idea,* then all that is *manifest* would have to be only *Specials* (as opposed to *Common* as they belong only to particular persons), because Ideas being in the form of special mental modifications, belong specially to particular individuals. (That is to say, one's Idea is not apprehended by another; thus the cognition of a person's Idea always remains uncognisable to another). In the case of a dancing girl, her side-long glances (which are manifest actions of the eye) are stared at continuously by many persons at the same time. If it were otherwise (ie if the glance were merely an *Idea*) then this could not be possible (ie then the staring at one person by many persons at the same time would not be there).

Unintelligent - Everything, *Pradhāna, Buddhi* and the rest are insentient. Sentiency does not belong to *Buddhi* as held by the *Vainā́sikas.* (The followers of a particular school of Buddhists). *Prolific:* because, it is possessed of the faculty of producing unceasingly. The form of the word ought to have been *prasava-dharma* (in the text instead of *prasavadharmi*); but the author has employed the particular possessive affix here in order to point out that the Manifest is endowed with the property of constant productiveness and that it never ceases from evolving similar and dissimilar products. By saying *so is pradhāna,* the author attributes the properties of the Manifest to the unmanifest *Pradhāna* also, that is to say, as is the Manifest, so is the

unmanifest. By saying, *The Spirit is the reverse of both,* the author points out their dissimilarity to the Spirit.

Objection: There are points of similarity between the *Puruṣa* and the *Pradhāna,* such as causelessness, eternality and so on. Similarly, there is similarity between the *Manifested* and the *Puruṣa,* such as being multiform. Then how is it that you say that the *Puruṣa* is the reverse of these?

Answer: This is replied: *'yet also similar.'* Here *ca* has the meaning of *api* also. Though there are points of similarity such as *causelessness* etc there are also points of dissimilarity, such as the absence of these attributes and the rest.

What are the three attributes and what are their characteristics? The next verse answers this:

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।
अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥

Guṇāḥ, The attributes; *prīti-aprīti-viṣāda-ātmakāḥ,* are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion; *prakāśa-pravṛtti-niyamārthāḥ,* they serve the purpose of illumination, endeavour and restraint; *anyonya-abhibhava-āśraya-janana-mithuna vṛttayaḥ ca,* and are mutually dominating, supporting, productive and cooperative.

12. The attributes are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion; they serve the purpose of illumination, action and restraint and they are mutually dominating and supporting, productive and cooperative.

Guṇāḥ - They are called so because they exist for the sake of the other (ie the Spirit). In the next Kārikā, *Sattva* and other *Guṇas* will be explained in a systematic order. Following the maxim of foresight, or according to the convention among the authors of treatises, *prīti* etc (appearing in this Kārikā) ought to be considered in the same order (as *sattva* etc in the next Kārikā). The meaning is that *prīti* being pleasure, *sattva* attribute comes to

be known as *of the nature of pleasure; aprīti* is pain and is of the nature of *Rajas; Viṣāda* is delusion; so, *Tamas* is of the nature of delusion. In order to refute the contention that 'pleasure is nothing more than the mere absence of pain' and 'pain is no more than the absence of pleasure,' the term (of the nature of) *ātman* has to be read with the above. Pleasure and pain are not merely mutual negations, but they are positive entities and the term *ātma* connotes this positive reality. Therefore, those whose nature consists of pleasure are *prītyātman.* Other terms too are to be explained accordingly. Positive nature of these (ie of pleasure etc) is established by common experience. If they were merely of the nature of mutual negations, then they would be dependent on each other, in which case non-fulfilment of the one would lead to the non-fulfilment of the other too.

Having thus described their nature, the author next describes their several uses and purposes. 'They serve the purpose of illumination, action and restraint.' Here too, these three are to be compounded (with *guṇas*) as before. The attribute of *Rajas* which is always and everywhere action-oriented, motivates the buoyant *sattva guṇa* to action if it were not restrained by the dull *Tamas* attribute; if it were restrained by the *Tamas* attribute, then it operates only intermittently. Thus, the *Tamas* here functions as a restraining element.

Having thus explained their uses, the author next explains their operation: 'they are mutually dominating and supporting, productive and cooperative.' *Vṛtti* (in the text) is function and this is to be connected with each term in the compound. (Then it will be *anyonya-abhibhava-vṛtti* etc).

1. *Mutually dominating* because, when one becomes active for some purpose, it dominates over the other (ie it subjugates the other). For example, *Sattva* attains its calm nature only after dominating over (or subjugating) the *Rajas* and *Tamas* attributes. Similarly, the *Rajas* attains its agitated nature by subduing the

Sattva and *Tamas* attributes and *Tamas* attains to its torpid condition by subjugating both *Sattva* and *Rajas.*

2. *Mutualy supporting:* The statement *supporting each other* is not made in the sense of *the container and the contained:* What is meant by *āśraya* (support) here is that when the operation of one depends upon another, then it becomes the *āśraya* of the former. For instance, *Sattva* by resting upon *activity* and *restraint,* subserves *Rajas* and *Tamas* attributes with illumination. *Rajas* by resting upon *illumination* and *restraint* subserves *Sattva* and *Tamas* with *activity;* and *Tamas* resting on *illumination* and *activity* subserves *Sattva* and *Rajas* with restraint.

3. *Mutually productive:* One produces its effects resting upon the other two. *Production* here means *modification* and it is always of the same nature as of the attributes. This is why it (*modification*) is not caused (ie not produced by some cause) because of the absence of a cause which is a different *Tattva.* Neither is *non-eternality* entailed here because of the absence of dissolution (*laya*) in another *tattwa.* (ie there is no merging of it into another *tattwa* essentially different from itself).

4. *Mutually cooperative:* That is, they are mutually concomitants and never exist separated from one another. The particle *ca* is used in the collective sense. In support of the above there is this *āgama* text (Devī Bhāgavata-3.8)

Anyonyamithunāḥ sarve sarve sarvatra gāminaḥ ।
Rajaso mithunaṁ sattvam sattvasya mithunaṁ rajaḥ ।
Tamasaścāpi mithune te sattvarajasī ubhe ।
Ubhayoḥ sattvarajasor mithunam Tama ucyate ।
Naiṣāmādiḥ samprayogo viyogo vopalabhayate ।।

—All the attributes are mutual consorts; all go everywhere (ie are omnipresent). *Sattva* is the consort of *Rajas, Rajas* is the consort of *Sattva;* both of these *Sattva* and *Rajas* are the consorts of *Tamas* and *Tamas* is the consort of both *Sattva* and *Rajas.* The first union or disunion of these has never been seen.' It has been

said that the attributes serve the purpose of illumination, activity and restraint. Next is being explained as to what those attributes are and why they are so:

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।
गुरु वरणकमेव तमः प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

Sattvam, the *Sattva,* attribute; *laghu,* buoyant, active; *prakāśakaṁ,* illuminating, enlightening; *ca,* and *rajas* the *Rajas* attribute; *iṣṭam,* desired; *upaṣṭambhakaṁ,* exciting; *calaṁ,* mobile, restless. *Tamaḥ-Tamas,* attribute; *Guru,* heavy, sluggish; *Varaṇakam,* enveloping, obscuring; *eva,* to be sure; *ca,* and; *vṛttiḥ,* (their) operation, functioning; *arthataḥ,* (is) for a (single) purpose; *pradīpavat,* like a lamp.

13. The *Sattva* attribute is buoyant and illuminating; the *Rajas* attribute is exciting and mobile; and the *Tamas* attribute is sluggish and obscuring; Their functioning is for a single purpose, like that of a lamp.

The Sāṅkhya Teachers hold that (of the three *guṇas*) the *Sattva* attribute alone is buoyant and illuminating. Here *lāghava* (buoyancy) is that quality which is the cause for springing up of things and is opposed to sluggishness. It is this quality which causes the shooting upward of the flame of fire. Sometimes, the same quality of *lāghava* (buoyancy) causes lateral motion also, as in the case of air. Therefore, *lāghavam* is that which cause the efficient functioning of all instruments, while sluggishness would make the instruments inefficient. The illuminative character of *Sattva guṇa* has been explained (in the earlier verse).

Now, *Sattva* and *Tamas* are attributes which are inactive by themselves and, are therefore, unable to produce their own effects, derive their driving force from *Rajas* which rouses them from their inertia and excites them to accomplish their own respective effects. That is why it is said that *Rajas* is *exciting.* It is

exciting because it is *mobile.* Through this it is indicated that the operation of *Rajas* is necessary for all activity. The *Rajoguṇa,* because of its mobility, keeps the three *guṇas* in a continuous state of activity; but it is operative only in some cases because of its mobility getting restrained by the sluggish and obscuring qualities of *Tamas.* Therefore, in order to distinguish it from *Rajas, Tamas* is said to be the restraining force in the Text: '*Tamas* is both sluggish and obscuring.' The particle *eva* (appended to *Tamas*) is to be appended to *Sattva* and *rajas* also; thus it is to be read as *sattvameva, raja eva* and *tama eva.*

Objection: Now, these *guṇas* are endowed with mutually contradicting properties. It is but natural that (instead of co-operating) they would only destroy each other like Sunda and Upasunda.[6]

Answer: It has been said earlier that their functioning is for a common purpose, like that of a lamp. It is a matter of common observation that the wick and oil, though opposed to the action of fire, when brought together, they cooperate to perform the task of giving light. In a similar way, the three humours of the body, viz, wind, bile and phlegm, though possessed of mutually opposite properties, cooperate with each other for the sole purpose of sustaining the body. In the same way, *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas* attributes also though contradictory to each other, cooperate and effect their single purpose of bringing about the emancipation of the *Puruṣa* - (Spirit), as has been explained (in Kārikā 31): 'Serving the purpose of the *Puruṣa* is the sole motive (for the activity of the instruments); by nothing else is an instrument (organ) made to act!

6. Sunda and Upasunda were sons of Nikumbha. After terrible ascetic practices for many many years, they got a boon from Brahmā that they would not die unless they kill themselves. On the strength of this boon, they grew very oppressive. Indra at last had to send down a lovely nymph named Tilottamā, and while quarrelling for her, they killed each other.

Pleasure, pain and *delusion* are mutually contradictory attributes and people naturally assume their causes also as having the nature of *pleasure, pain* and *delusion,* following their respective connotations. And these causes appear in many forms, because, by their very nature, they are mutually suppressive. As for instance, a single woman endowed with youth, beauty and virtue is the source of happiness to her husband because, to him, she appears in the form pleasure; but the very same woman is the cause of pain to her co-wives, because, to them, she appears in the form of pain. Again, the same woman deludes another man who is unable to have her; to him she appears in the form of delusion. The example of this woman illustrates the nature of all things. That thing which causes pleasure is the *Sattva guṇa* the essence of which is pleasure; that which causes *pain* is *Rajas* which is of the nature of *pain* and that which causes *delusion* is *Tamas* which is of the nature of *delusion.* Pleasure, enlightenment and buoyancy, appearing simultaneously in one substratum, are not mutually contradictory, because, they are seen to co-exist together. Thus, there is no need to assume a different cause for each of pleasure, enlightement and buoyancy as they are not mutually contradictory unlike in the case of *pleasure, pain* and *delusion* which are mutually contradictory (and as such cannot co-exist in the same substratum) and assumption of three different causes becomes necessary. Similar is the case with regard to *pain, mobility* and *activity* (properties of *Rajas*), and *delusion, sluggishness* and *obscurity* (properties of *Tamas,* where there is no need to assume different causes for each of the properties). Thus it is conclusively established that the attributes are only three.

Objection: Let the properties like *indistinguishability* and the rest which are things of our experience, subject in things like earth and others which are actually perceived. But how can we establish attributes like *indistinguishability, objectivity,*

insentiency and *productivity* as belonging to *Sattva* and other *guṇas* which are beyond the range of perceptible experience (as described in Kārikā 11)? This is answered in the following Kārikā:

अविवेक्यादेस्सिद्धिस्त्रैगुण्यात्तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।
कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥

Avivekyādeḥ, (The existence) of indistinguishability and others; *Siddhiḥ,* is proved; *traiguṇyāt,* from their being constituted of three attributes; *tad-viparyaya-abhāvāt,* from the absence of their reverse; (ie from the absence of non-existence of three *guṇas*); *Kāryasya-Kāraṇa-guṇa-ātmakatvāt,* from the effects which are of the same nature as that of the cause; *avyaktam,* The Unmanifest; *api,* also; *Siddham,* is proved.

14. (The existence) of indistinguishability and others (in the Manifest and the Unmanifest) is proved from their being constituted of three *guṇas* and from the absence of their reverse. The existence of the unmanifest is proved from the effects possessing the attributes of their cause.

Aviveki (in the text) is to be understood as *avivekitvam,* as is found in the Pāṇini Sūtra: '*dvyekayordvivacanaikavacane*' (1.4.22). Here, *dvi* and *eka* stand for *dvitva* and *ekatva* respectively; otherwise, the form of the compound would be *'dvyekeṣu.*'[7]

Question: How are properties like *indistinguishability* and others are proved to exist?

Answer: From the existence of three *guṇas.* Whatever is of the nature of *Pleasure, Pain* and *Delusion,* that thing is endowed

7. And not *dvyekayoḥ.* Here, if the compound is analysed into *dvi* and *eka,* the sum would be three; this would require a plural ending and not the dual ending as is found in the compound. If *dvi* and *eka* are explained as standing for *dvitva* and *ekatva,* then they can have dual ending as they make only two nouns.

with properties like *indistinguishability* and the rest, even like this Manifest which is directly perceived. This is inferred through the method of *agreement* (*anvaya anumāna*). This has not been stated explicitly in the text because it is clearly understood. But the *method of difference* (*vyatireki anumāna*) has been stated: *tadviparyayābhāvāt.* 'Whatever does not possess properties like *indistinguishability,* etc that thing does not possess *Pleasure, Pain* and *Delusion,* as in the case of *Puruṣa* (*Spirit*), in whom the three *guṇas* are non-existent. Alternatively, both the *Manifested* and the *Unmanifested* can be taken as the subject (*minor term, pakṣa*) of the syllogism in which the reasoning will be: *'because of the existence of three guṇas'* as a purely negative (avīta) inference.[8] There could be no other thing (besides the *Vyakta* and the *Avyakta*) where there could be an affirmation (of the middle term, ie the existence of the the attributes).

Objection: The existence of properties like *indistinguishability* etc in the *Avyakta* can be proved only if the existence of *Avyakta* is first proved. But the existence of *Avyakta* itself does not stand proved. How, then, could the existence of properties like *indistinguishablity* etc be proved?

Answer: *Because of the effects consisting of the same properties as those of the causes.* The meaning of the above argument is that all effects are verily found to be possessing the same properties of their causes. For example, the cloth etc are constituted of the same property as those of the yarns. Similarly, all products characterised as *Mahat* and the rest, possessing the

8. The full form of the syllogism is as follows: 'All things other than the Spirit, that is to say, both the Manifested and the Unmanifested, possess properties like indistinguishability etc since they possess three *guṇas* and whatever does not possess properties like indistinguishability etc also does not possess three *guṇas*.' In this syllogism we have the *vyakta* and the *avyakta* for the *Pakṣa.* Now, in this *pakṣa* can be comprehended all cases where the presence of three *guṇas* can be found.

form of *Pleasure, Pain* and *Delusion* must possess the properties of *Pleasure, Pain* and *Delusion,* inhering in its own cause. Thus, its cause in the form of *Pradhāna,* the Unmanifest, possessing the properties of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, becomes established.

Question: The followers of Kaṇāda (*Vaiśeṣikās*) and Gautama (*Naiyāyikas*) hold that the Manifest is produced from the Manifest. (*Vyaktāt vyaktam utpādyate*). The atoms are the manifests. From them proceeds the creation of manifest products of the nature of the Great Earth and the rest through a chain of combinations like the binary compound etc. The creation of qualities like *form* etc in Earth and other substances are in accordance with similar qualities in their causes (ie in atoms). Inasmuch as all the manifest substances and their qualities are produced from a Manifest cause, why postulate an Unmanifest cause which is not even a perceptible Entity?

This is replied:

भेदानां परिमाणात्, समन्वयात् शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥ १५ ॥
कारणमसत्यव्यक्तं प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च ।
परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥

Avyaktam Kāraṇam asti, There is the Unmanifest as the cause; *bhedānām parimāṇāt,* because of the finite nature of specific objects of the evolutes; *samanvayāt,* because of homogeneity; *ca,* and; *śaktitaḥ pravṛtteḥ,* because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause; *Kāraṇa-kārya vibhāgāt,* from the differentiation of cause and effect; *avibhāgāt,* because of non-differentiation or merging; *Vaiśvarūpyasya,* of the whole world (of effects); *triguṇataḥ,* through the three attributes; *pravartate,* it operates; *ca,* and; *samudayāt,* through combination; *pariṇāmataḥ,* through modification; *salilavat,* like water; *prati-prati-guṇa-āśraya-viśeṣāt,* through differences arising from diversity of the several receptacles of the attributes.

15 & 16. The Unmanifest cause exists because of (1) the finite nature of special objects; (2) homogeneity; (3) evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause; (4) the differentiation between cause and effect; (5) the non-differentiation or merging of the whole world of effects; (6) its operation through the three attributes by combination and modification, like water, through differences arising from diverse nature of the several receptacles of the attributes.

There exists this Unmanifest, the Root Cause, which is the cause of all specific products of elements like the Mahat and the rest upto the Earth element. Why so? 'Because of the difference between the cause and the effect and because of the non-difference (ie merging) of the whole world of effect.' It has been established that the effect is already existent in its cause. The limbs of the tortoise which already are there, when emerging out of its body, become distinguished from it when we express: 'this is the body of the tortoise and these are its limbs,' and when these limbs enter into its body, they become unmanifest. In the same way, products like jar, crown, etc emerge from their causes, viz, clay and gold, and become distinguished from their causes. Similarly, the pre-existing products like earth and the rest, emerge from their causes in the form of Primary Elements (Tanmātras) and become distinguished from their causes. The pre-existing Primary Elements emerge from their cause, the I-Principle (ahaṁkāra) and become distinguished from it. The pre-existing I-Principle emerges from its cause, the Great Principle (Mahat) and becomes distinguished from it. The pre-existing Great Principle emerges from its cause, the Supreme Unmanifest (Parama avyaktam) and becomes distinguished from its cause. Thus the whole universe of products related to its ultimate cause, the Highest Unmanifest, either immediately (as with Mahat) or

through successive series of productions (like the earth etc), comes to be distinguished from its cause — this is what is meant by 'differentiation between cause and effects.' At the time of dissolution, products like jar, crown etc merge back into their respective causes, clay and gold, ie they disappear in their causes and become unmanifest; that is to say, the effects become unmanifest in the form of their cause itself which is unmanifest as far as that particular product is concerned. Similarly, substances like Earth etc, entering the Primary Elements render them unmanifest in so far as the earth and other substances are concerned. In a similar way, the Primary Elements merge into the I-Principle rendering the I-Principle unmanifest in so far as the Primary elements are concerned; when the I-Principle disappears in the Mahat, it renders the Mahat unmanifest in so far as its own form is concerned. When, finally, this Mahat merges into the Prakṛti, it renders the Prakṛti unmanifested. But Prakṛti does not merge into anything else; it is the pure unmanifest state of all products. This is what is meant by the merging of the whole world of effects of all kinds. The term *vaiśvarūpya* is formed by affixing the reflective affix *ṣyañ*. Therefore the existence of the unmanifest as the cause is proved inasmuch as there is the separation and mergence of the already existing effects in the cause.

Further proof for the existence of the Unmanifest as the cause is given: *Because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause.* It is well-known that effects evolve due to the efficiency of the cause; for, no effect can ever arise from an inefficient cause. This efficiency is *latent* in the cause and is no other than the existent effect in its unmanifest condition. Thus, on the hypothesis that effect already exists in its cause, the existence of any other form of causal efficiency other than the latent form at the unmanifest effect, cannot be proved in the cause.

The difference between *sand* and *sesamum seed* which is the material cause of oil, lies in the fact that it is only in the

sesamum seed that oil exists in its unmanifest state and not in the *sand.*

Objection: Now, the reasons that *evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause* and *separation and merging of the cause and effect* prove the *supreme unmanifest character* (*parama avyaktatvam*) of *Mahat* itself. Then why postulate another *unmanifest entity* beyond that?

Answer: *Because of the finite nature of specific objects of the evolutes.* Here, the term *parimāṇāt* stands for *parimitatvāt* ie because of finiteness due to its non-pervasiveness. The form of syllogism here is as follows:

'*Mahat* and the rest which are the specific objects in question, have the *Avyakta* for their cause; because they are finite; like *jars* and the like.'

Jars etc are finite objects and are seen to inhere in their causes *clay* etc in an unmanifested state. It has already been said that cause is verily the unmanifested state of the effect. Thus, the cause of *Mahat* must be the *supreme unmanifest* and that should be the final cause as there is no proof for assuming a further unmanifest entity beyond that.

The specific objects in question must have the unmanifest as their cause for the reason of *homogeneity* (*samanvayāt*). Homogeneity is possessing common forms among different things. *Buddhi* and the rest are of the nature of *Pleasure, Pain* and *Delusion* and manifesting themselves as cognition etc are found to be homogeneous. Things which are invariably connected with certain forms must have only that for its cause which has those forms for its constituent elements, just as jar, crown etc which are inherent in clay and gold pieces, have clay and gold as their unmanifest causes. Thus, it is established that the *Unmanifest* exists as the cause of specific objects.

Having thus established the existence of the *unmanifest,* the author next states the methods of its operations: *it operates*

through the three attributes. At the time of cosmic dissolution, *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas* attributes undergo homogeneous modifications. The attributes are verily of the nature of modification. As such, they can never remain even for a moment without undergoing modification. Therefore, even at the time of dissolution, *sattva* attribute operates through its particular *sattva* form, *Rajas* operates through its own particular Rajas form and *Tamas* operates through its own *Tamas* form. (That is to say, the *guṇas* attain a state of equilibrium in their respective particular forms at the time of dissolution). That is why it is said: *operates through the three attributes.*

Yet another method of operation is given: *through combination* (*samudayāt*). Here, the term *samudayāt* means *appearing after having blended together.* And this *blending together* is not possible without some sort of relation of the *guṇas* with the *Principal guṇa.* (That is, the blending of the *guṇas* in a particular ratio in which subsidiary *guṇas* cooperate and combine with the Principal *guṇa*). This relationship of subserviency among the *guṇas* in which one is the principal, is not possible without *differentiation.* And this *differentiation* is not possible without mutual suppression. (That is, certain principal *guṇa* suppresses the other *guṇas* and then combines with them). This is the second method of operation by which *Mahat* and other products are evolved.

Question: How can diverse methods of operation be attributed to *guṇas* when they are of uniform nature?

Answer: *Because of modification, like water.* Even though the water released from the clouds is of one taste only, yet, it gets modified into different tastes like sweet, sour, saline, bitter, pungent and astringent according as it comes in contact with different modifications of earth and become transformed into the juice of fruits such as coconut, palmyra, palm, wood-apple, ebony fruit, Myrobalan fruit etc. In the same manner, owing

to the combination and mutual suppression of the subservient *guṇas,* the *guṇas* of Primordial Nature (*Pradhāna guṇāḥ*) come to be predominant one by one and thereby bring about diverse modifications in the state of various products. This is what has been said by the phrase: *through differences arising from diversity of the several receptacles of the attributes.* That is, by the peculiarities due to the predominance of one or the other of the *guṇas.*

There are some self-contented ones (*Tauṣṭikāḥ*-Materialists) who consider the Unmanifest or the Great Principle, or the I-Principle, or the senses or even the elements as the Spirit (*Ātman*), and worship them alone. To them, the author declares as follows:

सङ्घातपरार्थत्वात्त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

Saṅghāta, (because) all composite products; *parārthatvāt,* are for the sake another's use; *triguṅādi-viparyayāt,* because of the absence of three guṇas and other properties; *adhiṣṭhānāt,* because there must be some controlling agency; *bhoktṛbhāvāt,* because there must be an experiencer; *ca,* and; *pravṛtteḥ Kaivalyārtham,* because of the tendency of activities towards final beatitude; *Puruṣaḥ asti,* — The Spirit exists.

17. The Spirit exists because (a) the aggregate is for another's sake; (b) of the absence of three guṇas and other properties; (c) there must be some controller; (d) there must be some experiencer; and (e) of the tendency of activities towards final beatitude.

There must be the Spirit, distinct from the Unmanifest and other evolutes. Why? *Because all aggregates of components are for the sake of another.* The following is the form of syllogism here: 'The unmanifest, the Great Principle, the I-Principle and other products exist for another's sake, because they are

composites, like the bedstead, chair, unguents and the like.' The Unmanifest and the rest are all composites, because they are constituted of pleasure, pain and delusion (which are represented by *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas* attributes respectively).

Objection: Let it be so; but it is observed that bedsteads, chairs and other aggregates exist only for the use of the body which itself is a composite product; it is not seen that they are for the use of the Spirit which is beyond the Unmanifest and the rest. This leads us to the inference that composite products are verily for the purpose of some other composite product and not for the purpose of the Spirit which is non-composite.

This is answered: *because of the absence of the three guṇas and other properties.* The intention is this: if it is said that one composite thing is for the use of another composite thing, then, we have to infer yet another composite thing for the use of which the latter composite product exists; similarly, another composite product and so on. Thus we have to assume an unending series of composite products *ad infinitum.* With a reasonable termination being available, it is not proper to assume an endless series of composite products, as it leads to multiple assumptions. Nor can it be said that multiplication of assumptions becomes excusable when it is supported by evidence. Because, here, the composite character of the bedstead is put forward in the inference only in so far as it is concomitant with being for another's use. (It is not meant to include all the properties of the composite object). If it is insisted that inference should be in accord with all the properties (*sarvadharma anurodha*) of the corroborative example, then that would be the end of all inferences.[9] This has further been explained by us in *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-Tīkā.* Therefore, in

9. Because hardly can one come across any two occurrences in nature which are identical. Even in the Inference: 'The yonder hill is fiery, because of smoke, as in the hearth,' the fire in the hill is not similar to the fire in the hearth in all its aspects; because, the fire in the hearth is for cooking food,

order to avoid the absurdity of *regressus ad infinitum,* if we have to accept the non-composite nature of the Spirit, then we will have also to attribute to the Spirit the properties such as *without the three guṇas, non-distinguishability, non-objectivity, uncommonness, sentiency, and non-productivity.* Properties like the quality of possessing the three guṇas' etc are always accompanied by the nature of being composite. Thus, when the *nature of being composite* is excluded from the Spirit, then the being *of the three guṇas* in the Spirit also gets excluded, just as by excluding Brāhminness, all brāhmins like Kaṭha (a special class of brāhmin) and others get automatically excluded. Thus, when the Teacher of Sāṅkhya (Īsvara-Kṛṣṇa) laid down the term: 'because of the absence of three guṇas,' he intended to mean that there is some supreme thing which is not a composite product and that thing is the Spirit.

For the following reason also, Spirit as apart from Matter exists: *because there must be a controlling Agency,* that is, inasmuch as the evolutes constituted of the three guṇas are always controlled, there must be a controller. It is observed that whatever is of the nature of *pleasure, pain* and *delusion,* all such things are controlled by something else, just like the chariots etc being controlled by the charioteer etc. These *Buddhi* and other evolutes are constituted of the nature of *pleasure, pain* and *delusion;* therefore, they too must have some one else to control them, and that some one beyond the *three guṇas* is the *Spirit.*

For the following reason also, the Spirit exists: *because there must be an enjoyer.* The term *bhogya* indicates the objects of enjoyment in the form of pleasure and pain. Every soul experiences the objects of enjoyment as pleasure and pain according to

and is seen in the house made by men whereas such is not the case with fire in the mountain. So, if one were to insist that an inference must be in accord with all the properties of the corroborative examples like the fire in hearth in the above syllogism, then no inference is possible.

their being felt agreeable or disagreeable respectively. Now, this agreeable and disagreeable feelings can take place only in some one other than the feelings themselves. Feelings cannot be agreeable or disagreeable to *Buddhi* and other products because *Buddhi* etc are themselves constituted of pleasure and pain; otherwise, there will be the anomaly of things operating upon themselves. Therefore, only that thing which is not constituted of pleasure etc can have either agreeable or disagreeable feelings and *that is the Spirit.*

Others, however, interpret it thus: Things of enjoyment (*bhogyāḥ*) are the visible things, like the Buddhi and the rest. They cannot become visible without an observer. Therefore, there is a seer beyond the visible things like *Buddhi* and the rest, and that seer is the Spirit. *Because there is an experiencer* (in the text) means *because there is an observer,* ie because the observer is to be inferred from the visible. The visibility of *Buddhi* and the rest is to be inferred from the fact of their being constituted of pleasure etc like the earth and other substances.

Yet for another reason also the Spirit must be there: *because of the tendency of activities towards final beatitude.* According to the Scripture and Sages endowed with divine perception, the final beatitude characterised by the absolute and final cessation of the three kinds of pain can never take place in *Buddhi* and other products. *Buddhi* and other products are, by their very nature, constituted of pleasure etc; they can never be isolated from their component elements. Only that thing which is distinct from *Mahat* etc and which is not constituted of pleasure etc can be isolated. According to the Scriptures and opinions of wise-men of great intelligence, all activities tend towards final emancipation. Therefore, there must be something which is beyond *Buddhi* and the rest, and that is the Spirit.

Having thus proved the existence of the Spirit, the author next explains the theory of plurality of Spirits in answer to

questions whether the Spirit is one inhabiting many bodies, or many, being different in each body:

जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥

Puruṣa-bahutvam-siddham, Multiplicity of Spirits is established; *pratiniyamāt,* because of individual allotment; *Janana-maraṇa-karaṇānām,* of birth, death and instruments of action and cognition; *ca eva,* and verily; *pravṛtteḥ ayugapat,* because of non-simultaneity of activities; *traiguṇya viparyayāt,* because of the diverse modifications due to the three guṇas.

18. The multiplicity of the Spirit is verily established (1) from the individual allotment of birth, death and the instruments, (2) from the non-simultaneity of activities, and (3) from the diverse modifications due to the three *guṇas.*

On what basis is the plurality of Spirit established? This is answered: *because there is definite individual allotment of birth, death and the organs.* Birth is the connection of the Spirit with a particular aggregate of a special group of body, sense-organs, mind, I-Principle, Great Principle and experiences; it is not a modification of the Spirit, because the Spirit is not subject to any kind of modification. Death is only giving up of that body etc; it is not the *destruction* of the Spirit, because the Spirit is immutable and eternal. Organs of action and cognition are thirteen, beginning with *Buddhi. Niyama* is a particular adjustment of these organs, birth, death etc. It cannot be said that all these are connected with one Spirit dwelling in all the bodies. If the Spirit were one and the same in all bodies, then, when one is born, all would be born, when one dies, all would die; should one become blind etc, then, all else too would become blind. On one going out of mind, all would go out of mind; thus there will be confusion. A definite adjustment is possible only if a distinct *Puruṣa* dwelling in each set of body is accepted. Nor is it proper

to hold that a definite adjustment can be had by assuming that a single Puruṣa has connection with different adjuncts of bodies. Because, this also would land us in confusion as the Spirit would then either be born or die according to the differences of even adjuncts like the hands, breasts etc. For, a maiden does not become *dead* when her hands are cut off her body; nor does she become *born* on the appearance of breasts and other things on her body! For the following reason also, the Spirit must be different in each body: *because of non-simultaneity of activities.* Activity is a form of effort; though it is a function of the internal organs; yet, here, it is attributed to the Spirit in a figurative senses. If the Spirit were accepted as one in all the bodies, then, when the Spirit is active in one body, all the bodies would become active and there would be simultaneous movement in all the bodies. This absurdity can be done away with if the Spirit is accepted as multiple, ie each Spirit in each body.

For the following reason also, Spirit is different in each body: *because of the diverse modifactions of the three guṇas. Eva* in the text should be read after *siddham* and not with *Viparyaya* (as found in the text) to emphasise that the plurality of the Spirit is verily a proved fact (*siddhameva*), and *not* an *unproved* one. *Traiguṇya* means the three attributes. Their differentiation is *Viparyaya.* Some abound in *Sattva* attribute, ie the composition of their body excels in *sattva guṇa,* like the ascetics and divinities.[10] Some abound in *Rajoguṇa,* like ordinary people; some abound in *Tamoguṇa,* such as animals etc born in inferior wombs. This differentiation in the distribution of the three *guṇas* in different entities could not be explained if the Spirit were to be one and the same in all the bodies. This defect can be eliminated if the Puruṣa is accepted as multiple.

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10. *Ūrdhvaśrotasaḥ,* ie those whose vital fluid flows upwards, ie those who abstain from sexual intercourse, like saints, ascetics etc.

Having thus established the plurality of the Spirit, the author next states the properties of the Spirit as a knowledge of these are conducive to the attainment of discriminative wisdom (*Viveka jñāna*):

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात् सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैवल्यं माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥

Tasmāt-ca-viparyāsāt, And from that contrast; *asya-puruṣasya sākṣitvam siddham,* is established that the Puruṣa is a witness; *Kaivalyam,* is solitary; *mādhysthyam,* is neutral; *draṣṭṛtvam,* is a seer; *akartṛbhāvaḥ ca,* and is a non-agent.

19. And from that contrast it is established that the Spirit is the pure witness. He is solitary, neutral, spectator, and non-agent.

The particle *ca* in the text adds the following properties of the Spirit to its plurality. *If* it had been said *Viparyāsād asmāt - And from this contrast* (in the text), then the reference would relate to the *'differentiation due to the three guṇas'* appearing in the previous Kārikā. To avoid this it is said *tasmāt*-from that-(in the text). A thing immediately preceeding becomes the object of the pronoun *idam-this;* whereas by *tad-that,* something not so proximate is denoted; hence, *tad* here denotes 'three attributes,' 'indistinguishability' etc mentioned much earlier in Kārikā 11. Therefore, the phrase: *opposite* of *three guṇas etc* connotes the properties of the Spirit, such as being without three *guṇas,* possessing the quality of discrimination, being non-objective, uncommon, sentiency, and non-prolific. The properties of being *sentient* and *non-objective* indicate the characteristics of being a witness and a seer. A sentient being alone can be a seer and not an insentient being; one becomes a witness only when objects are shown to him; he is a witness to whom objects are exhibited. In daily life we find that the two parties of a dispute show the object of the dispute to the witness; in a similar way, the *prakṛti* also exhibits its creations to the Puruṣa who thus becomes the witness.

No object can be exhibited to one who himself is an object and is insentient. The Spirit thus becomes the *witness* as it is both the sentient and non-objective. For the same reason also, the Spirit is the *seer.*

The Spirit is *solitary* because of the absence of three *guṇas. Solitariness* or *Isolation* is the final and absolute cessation of three kinds of pain. And the Spirit being without three guṇas by its very nature, the absence of *Pleasure, Pain* and *Delusion* also will be there, which proves the solitary nature of the Puruṣa. Puruṣa is also *neutral,* because, of the same quality of being without the three *guṇas.* One who is satiated with happiness is a happy man; he who hates pain is a miserable man; such a one cannot be a neutral person. Only he who is devoid of both, can be called neutral or indifferent. The non-agentship of the Puruṣa is proved from its being discriminative and non-producing.

Objection: Let it be so; but it is a fact of experience, that one decides what is to be done by him after proper reasoning, and then thinks as follows: 'I am a sentient being, I want to do this, and I shall do so.' Thus it is proved that *sentiency* and *activity* are found to co-exist in the same substratum. This argument contradicts the Sāṇkhya theory that the *Sentient* is inactive and the *insentient* is the active agent. This is answered:

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
गुणकर्तृत्वेऽपि तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ॥ २० ॥

Tasmāt, Therefore; *Tatsaṁyogāt,* from conjunction with the *Puruṣa; acetanam liṅgam,* the insentient evolute; *cetanāvat iva,* (appears) as if possessing sentiency; *tathā,* and similarly; *guṇa-kartṛtve api,* also from agency really belonging to the attributes; *udāsīnaḥ,* the neutral; *Karteva bhavati,* appears as if he were the agent.

20. Therefore, through this union, the insentient evolute appears as if it is intelligent; and similarly, also from agency belonging to the *guṇas,* the neutral Spirit appears as if it were the Agent.

The term *tasmāt* (in the text) suggests that inasmuch as *sentiency* and *agency* having been proved by reasons to be in different substrata, the objections (immediately preceeding the above verse) are only false impressions. The cause of the false impression (of the objector) is the union, ie the proximity of the Spirit with the evolute. The word *liṅga* (in the text) stands for every evolute from the Great Principle down to the Primary Elements. The rest is clear enough.

Objection: It is said in the above verse: *Through this union.* But there can be no union between two different things without some mutual need; and this expectation of some need is not possible without the relation of the *helped* and the *helper.* (Then, how is it possible to have any union between the Spirit and the Evolute if there is no mutual expectancy)?

This is replied:

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य ।
पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः ॥ २१ ॥

Pradhānasya, of the Primordial Nature; *puruṣasya,* by the Spirit; *darśanārtham,* for the sake of exhibition; *tathā Kaivalyārtham,* and for the sake of emancipation; *pañgu-aṅdhavat,* like the lame and the blind; *ubhayoh api,* of both also; *saṁyogaḥ,* there is union; *tat kṛtaḥ sargaḥ,* from this union proceeds the creation.

21. For the exhibition of nature to the Spirit and for the emancipation of the Spirit, (there is conjunction between the Spirit and Nature) like the union between the lame and the blind; from this conjunction proceeds creation.

The term *pradhānasya* (in the text) is in the genitive affix having active force. It means: *'for the sake of perception of Pradhāna, the cause of all evolutes, by the Puruṣa.'* By this, the fact of nature as being an object of enjoyment is shown. From

this it follows that *pradhāna* as an *object of enjoyment* could not be without an *enjoyer;* therefore, it is quite logical to accept that the *Pradhāna* needs an enjoyer. Next, the author shows the need of the Spirit for *Pradhāna* by saying: *for the sake of isolation of the Spirit.* The Spirit, ignorant of its distinction from *Pradhāna,* while in union with that, considers the three kinds of pain which are really the constituents of *Pradhāna,* to be his own; and seeks liberation from this bondage. And this liberation is possible only on the knowledge that the *Puruṣa* is distinct from *Pradhāna.* This knowledge of distinctness of *Puruṣa* from *Pradhāna* cannot take place without the *Pradhāna* (with all its evolutes). Thus, for its own liberation, the *Puruṣa* needs *Pradhāna.* This *union* is eternal due to the continuous series of connections between the Spirit and the Nature. Though the Spirit unites with Nature for the purpose of enjoyment, it unites again with it for the purpose of achieving liberation.

Question: Let there be union between the *Puruṣa* and the *Pradhāna;* but whence is this evolution of *Mahat* and the rest?

This is answered: *From this proceeds creation.* Union by itself would not suffice either for enjoyment or for liberation if *Mahat* and the rest were not there; hence the act of union itself brings about the evolution for the sake of enjoyment and liberation.

Now is explained the process of evolution:

प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः ।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात्पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥

Prakṛteḥ, From Prakṛti; *Mahān,* evolves *Mahat,* The Great Principle; *tataḥ,* from that; *ahaṁkāraḥ,* proceeds the I-Principle; *tasmāt ca,* and from that; *ṣodaśakaḥ gaṇaḥ,* proceeds a set of sixteen; *ṣoḍaśakāt tasmād api pañcabhyaḥ,* from the five of this set of sixteen; *pañca bhūtāni,* proceed the five elements.

22. From the Primordial Matter evolves the Great Principle; from this evolves the I-Principle; from this evolves the set of sixteen; from the five of this set of sixteen, evolves the five elements.

Prakṛti is the Unmanifest. *Mahat,* the Great Principle, and *Ahaṅkāra,* the I-Principle will be defined later. The set of sixteen consist of eleven sense-organs, to be described later, and five *tanmātras* (Primary elements). Since this set is limited by sixteen, it is known as a *set of sixteen.* From the five Primary elements out of the above sixteen, evolve five elementary substances such as Space, Earth, Water, Air and Fire.

(a) From the Primary element of sound (*śabda Tanmātra*) proceeds Space (*ākāśa*) having sound as its characteristic property; (b) from the primary elements of touch as combined with that of sound, proceeds Air (*Vāyu*) with sound and touch as its characteristic properties; (c) from the Primary element of colour (*rūpa*) as combined with those of sound and touch proceeds Fire (*tejas*) with sound, touch and form as its characteristic properties; (d) from the primary element of taste (*rasa*) as combined with those of sound, touch and form proceeds Water (*āpaḥ*) possessing sound, touch, form and taste as its characteristic properties; and (e) from the primary element of odour (gaṅdha) as combined with those of sound, touch, form and taste proceeds Earth (pṛthvi) with sound, touch, form, taste and odour as its characteristic properties.

The Unmanifest has been defined in general terms by the statement *the reverse of this is the Unmanifest* etc (in Kārikā 10), and in specific terms by the statement *Sattva is buoyant and illuminating* etc (in Kārikā 13). The Manifest too has been defined in general terms by the statement *depending upon a cause* (in Kārikā 10) etc. Now *Buddhi* which is a special form of the Manifested, and whose knowledge is conducive to obtain discriminative wisdom, is being defined.

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् ।
सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्य्यस्तम् ॥ २३ ॥

Buddhiḥ, The Great Principle; *Adhyavasāyaḥ,* is ascertainment or will; *dharmaḥ,* Virtue; *jñānam,* wisdom; *virāgaḥ,* dispassion; *aiśvaryam,* lordliness or Power; *etad rūpam,* constitute its forms; *sāttvikam,* when sattva attribute abounds; *asmāt,* from this; *viparyastam,* reverse; *Tāmasam,* when Tamas attribute abounds.

23. Buddhi is ascertainment or will. Virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power are its manifestations when *sattva* attribute abounds. And the reverse of these, when *tamas* attribute abounds.

Buddhi is ascertainment: This statement in apposition is intended to indicate that there is no difference between the function and the functionary. It is well known in this world that all functionaries first think over the matter; and then consider themselves as entitled to do it and determine that they ought to do it and then proceed to do it Now, this determination that a certain thing has to do done, is of the *buddhi* which has acquired sentiency owing to its proximity to the sentient faculty (of the Spirit). This power of determination is the special operation of the *Buddhi* and *Buddhi* is non-different from the operation. This is a definition of *Buddhi* in so far as this definition distinguishes *Buddhi* from all classes of similar and dissimilar things.

Having thus defined the *buddhi,* the author next states its properties as abounding in *sattva* and *tamas* attributes etc as a knowledge of those properties is conducive to the attainment of discriminative wisdom: Virtue is the cause of both secular prosperity and the highest good (*abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa*). Merit that is accrued by the performance of sacrifices, charity, etc lead to worldly prosperity. The merit brought about by the practice of the eight-fold yoga (aṣṭāṅga yoga) leads to the Highest (Spiritual) good. Wisdom consists in the Knowledge of difference between the attributes (as constituting *prakṛti*) and the

Puruṣa (Spirit). Dispassion is the absence of passion (for sensual enjoyments).

Dispassion is four-fold known as (1) *yatamāna samjñā,* (2) *Vyatireka samjñā,* (3) *ekeṅdriya samjñā,* (4) *vaśīkāra samjñā.* Passion and other emotions which are so many impurities, dwell in the *citta,* the retentive faculty; prompted by them, the sense organs flow towards their respective objects. The preliminary efforts at boiling (purifying) those impurities (in the form of passion etc) in order that the sense-organs do not turn towards their objects, is the first known *Yatamāna samjñā* or the *Stage of endeavour.* When this effort of boiling (ie purification) is commenced, it is found that some passions have become refined or purified while some others are in the stage of getting purified. At this stage the relation of before and after (*purvāparī bhāva*) comes into existence. The ascertainment of the purified emotions from those that are in the process of being purified by means of discrimination is the second stage of dispassion known as *vyatireka samjñā* or *discriminative stage.* When the sense-organs have become incapable of activities, the purified emotions continue to dwell in the *chitta* in the form of mere craving. This is the third stage known as *ekeṅdriya samjñā, the one-organ stage.* The cessation of this craving also which is subsequent to the first three stages, towards all sensuous and supersensuous objects of enjoyments even when they are near at hand, is the fourth stage known as *vaśīkāra samjñā, the control stage* which has thus been described by the Blessed Patañjali: 'The dispassion known as *vaśīkāra samjñā* belongs to one who has rid himself of the craving for both the seen and revealed objects of enjoyment.' (1-15). This type of dispassion is a property of the Buddhi.

Power also is a property of *Buddhi* from which perfections like *aṇimā* and the rest become manifest. *Aṇimā* is to become atomic by means of which one could enter into even (such dense matters) as stones; *laghimā* is levitation by which one could go to

solar regions by following the path of sun's rays. *Mahimā* is magnification by which one becomes great; *prāpti* - is the ability to touch the farthest, by which one would be able to touch the moon with fingertips. *Prākāmya* is unfettered fulfilment of desires, by which one would be able to sink into the earth and rise again as in water; *Vaśītvam* is mastery by which one masters all elements and their products and is not mastered by others. *Īśitvam* is sovereignty by which one becomes sovereign over production, absorption and arrangement of elements and their productions. *Yatra Kāmāvasāyitvam* is the infallibility of will, by which all the elements follow the course as willed by him. The decisions of ordinary mortals follow what has already been ordained whereas in the case of Yogins, their will dictates the course of events. Thus four are the properties of *Buddhi* abounding in *Sattva* attribute. The *Buddhi* abounding in *Tamas* attribute has just the reverse of those properties, viz, vice or demerit, ignorance, passion, and servility. Thus four are the properties of *Buddhi* abounding in *Tamas.*

The author next defines *ahaṁkāra,* the I-Principle:

अभिमानोऽहंकारः तस्माद् द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः ।
एकादशकश्च गणः तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव ॥ २४ ॥

Ahaṁkāraḥ abhimānaḥ, I-Principle is self-assertion; *Tasmāt,* from that; *pravartate,* proceeds; *dvividhaḥ sargaḥ eva,* a two-fold evolution only; *ekādaśakaḥ gaṇaḥ,* the set of eleven; *ca,* and; *Tanmātra pañcakaḥ,* the pentad of Primary elements; *ca,* and.

24. *Ahaṁkāra* is self-assertion; from that proceeds a two-fold evolution only, viz, the set of eleven and the five-fold primary (or rudimentary) elements.

Ahaṁkāra is self-assertion. The ego centricity, involved in self-assertions as observed in ideas which are well-thought of and reasoned and take such forms as 'I am entitled to this,' 'verily, I am competent to do this,' 'all these objects of sense are for my

sake only,' 'there is none else other than me who is entitled for this,' 'hence I am,' etc are the unique operations of this *ahaṁkāra,* depending upon which the *Buddhi* determines like *'this should be done by me.'* Its different products are mentioned: *from that proceeds a two-fold evolution.* The two forms of this evolution are stated; *the set of eleven* consisting of the sense organs, and the five-fold Primary elements. *Eva* in the text has the force of emphasising that only these two sets of evolution proceed from the I-Principle and nothing else.

Objection: Let it be so; Now, the I-Principle and the rest are of uniform nature; how can two different kinds of evolution viz, the insentient (elements) and the illuminative (sense) which are of mutually contradictory nature, proceed from such a cause?

This is answered in the following verse:

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ।
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसस्तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥

Vaikṛtād ahaṁkārāt, From out of the Vaikṛta form of *ahaṁkāra; ekādaśakaḥ,* the set of eleven; *sāttvikaḥ,* substances abounding in *sattva* attribute; *pravartate,* evolves. *Tanmātraḥ,* the primary elements; *būtādeḥ,* (proceed) from the *Bhūtādi* form of the I-Principle; *sa tāmasaḥ,* they abound in *Tamas; taijasād,* from the *Taijasa* form of I-Principle; *ubhayam,* both of them (the *indriyas* and the *tanmātras*) proceed.

25. The set of eleven abounding in *sattva* proceeds from the *Vaikṛta* form of I-Principle; the set of five primary elements proceed from the *Bhūtādi* form of I-Principle; they are *Tāmasa.* From the *Taijasa* form of I-Principle proceed both of them.

From the *Vaikṛta* I-Principle abounding in *sattva* attribute having properties of buoyancy and illumination, proceed the set of eleven sense organs. From the *Bhūtādi* I-Principle abounding in Tāmasa attribute, the set of Primary elements proceed. How so? Because the set of five Primary elements abound in *Tamas*

attribute. The I-Principle, though one and uniform, evolves products of diverse kinds according as it is either dominated or suppressed by one or other of the three guṇas.[11]

Objection: If all the products are evolved by the action of *Sattva* and *Tamas* attributes only, then, what good is *Rajas,* which serves no useful purpose?

Answer: From the *Taijasa,* both of these evolve, ie from the I-Principle abounding in *Rajoguṇa* proceed both the sets of eleven and five. Just because the *Rajas* attribute does not produce exclusively any seperate product it cannot be said that the *Rajas* attribute serves no useful purpose inasmuch as it energises both *Sattva* and *Tamas* attributes which, by themselves, are absolutely inert and as such incapable of performing any function, and thus *Rajas* becomes instrumental in the evolution of both the sets of products by the *Sattva* and *Tamas* attributes (of the I-Principle) by exciting *Sattva* and *Tamas* to perform their own activities.

In order to describe the set of eleven, predominated by the *Sattva* attribute, the author in the following verse describes the ten external sense-organs:

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि ।
वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थाः कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः ॥ २६ ॥

Buddhi indriyāṇi, The organs of cognition (are); *ākhyāni,* known as; *cakṣuḥ,* the Eye; *śrotram,* the Ear; *ghrāṇa,* the Nose; *rasanā,* the Tongue; *tvak,* (and) the Skin; *Karmendriyāṇi āhuḥ,* (the following) are known as the organs of action; *Vāk,* Speech; *pāṇi,* Hand; *pāda,* Feet; *pāyu,* Anus; *upasthaḥ,* and the generative organ.

26. Organs of knowledge (or cognition) are called the Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue and the Skin. The organs of action

11. When *Sattva guṇa* dominates, the *ahaṁkāra* is called *Vaikṛta;* when *Tamo guṇa* dominates, it is called *Bhūtādi,* and when *Rajo guṇa* dominates it is called *Taijasa.*

are called the Speech, the Hand, the Feet, the excretory organ and the organ of generation.

Organness (*indriyatvam*) is to have for its *substratum* (ie as its constituent adjunct (*upādānakatvam*) the I-Principle abounding in Sattva attribute, and it is of two kinds: organs of knowledge, and organs of action. Both of these organs are called *iṅdriyas* inasmuch as they serve as the *indicators* of the Spirit.[12] They are known by their respective names such as Eye etc. Of these, the organ or the instrument through which colour is perceived is the Eye, that which perceives sound is the Ear, that which perceives odour is the Nose, that which perceives taste is the Tongue, and that which perceives touch is the Skin. The function of the organs of speech and the rest are spoken of later on (in Kārikā 28).

The eleventh sense organ is next described:

उभयात्मकमत्र मनः, संकल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात् ।
गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च ॥ २७ ॥

Atra, Among these sense organs; *manaḥ ubhayātmakam,* mind possesses the nature of both; *Saṅkalpakam,* it is deliberative; *ca sādharmyāt,* and because of common properties; *iṅdriyam,* it is an organ (as well); *nānātvam,* its multifariousness; *bāhya bhedāḥ ca,* and also its external diversities; *guṇa-pariṇāma-viśeṣāt,* are because of special modifications of the Attribute.

27. Of these (sense organs), the Mind possesses the nature of both (the sensory and motor organs). It is the deliberating principle, and is also called a sense organ since it possesses properties common to the sense organs. Its multifariousness and also

12. *Iṅdrasya idam iti iṅdriyam:* it is *iṅdriya* because it reminds one of *Iṅdra,* meaning *paramātmā,* the Supreme Soul. *Indriya* is, therefore, that which reminds one of the Supreme Lord. All *iṅdriyas* work for the sake of the *Ātman* only.

its external diversities are owing to special modifications of the Attributes.

Among the eleven sense-organs, the Mind possesses the characteristics of both, ie it is an organ of knowledge, and also is an organ of action inasmuch as sensory organs like the Eye and the rest and the motor organs like the Speech and the rest operate on their respective objects only when the Mind cooperates with them. (That is to say, cognition or action is possible only when the mind is operative in conjunction with the organ and receives the impression). Next the author states the special definition of the Mind: *it is the deliberating* principle; that is to say, the mind appears in the form of deliberation. As for example, when a certain object is vaguely apprehended by a sense organ merely as *this is something,* a doubt arises as to whether *it be this* or *it be that.* The mind correctly cognises it as *it is this and not that* by discerning the properties as belonging to the thing apprehended. Thus has it been described by an ancient text:

Sammugdhaṁ Vastumātraṁ hi Prāggṛhṇaṅti avikalpitam ।
Tat sāmānyaviśeṣābhyāṁ kalpayaṅti manīṣiṇaḥ ।।
Also, Asti hi ālocanaṁ jnānaṁ Prathamaṁ nirvikalpakam ।
Bālamūkādi vijñāna sadṛśaṁ Śuddha vastujāmiti ।।
Tataḥ paraṁ punarvastu dharmairjādibhir yayā ।
buddhyā' vasiyate sā hi pratyakṣatvena saṁmatā ।।

— 'At first, one apprehends an object in a vague way merely as a thing; then the intelligent people cognise it as belonging to a certain genus and as possessing certain specific properties.

'Also, (says another writer): First one has a simple and indeterminate apprehension of a thing before him, like the idea in the mind of a boy, a dumb person and the like. After this, the thing is cognised as possessing certain properties and as belonging to a certain genus etc. The cognition that apprehends all this is also accepted as sense perception.' This operation

characterised by the faculty of deliberation belongs to the mind and it serves to distinguish the mind from all similar and dissimilar classes of things.

Objection: Let it be so; but *Mahat* and *Ahaṁkāra,* having distinct operations of their own, are not classed as sense organs. Hence, the mind too should not be classed as a sense organ inasmuch as it too has a distinct operation of its own.

This is answered: *it is a sense organ.* Why? *because it has properties in common with the other sense organs. Homogeneity* is to have for its constituent cause the I-Principle abounding in *sattva* attribute. Here, indriya should not be interpreted in the sense of its being a characterestic of *Iṅdra* (Spirit), because, in that case both Mahat and I-Principle also would have to be classed under the senses inasmuch as they too possess the above characteristic. Therefore, its being the indicator of the Spirit should be taken only as occuring from the derivation of the term *iṅdriya* and not from its operational character.

Question: How is it that a set of eleven sense-organs proceeds from a single I-Principle abounding in *Sattva* attribute?

Answer: *Its multifariousness and also its external diversities are due to peculiar modifications of the Attributes.* The diversity of a product is due to the diversity in the auxiliary unseen force that brings about the experiences of sound and other objects. The diversity in the unseen force is also a modificatiion of the Attribute. The statement in the text *bāhyabhedāḥ - external diversities,* is added for the purpose of illustration, that is to say, the multifariousness of the mind is just like the diverse external forms, (all owing to the diverse modifications of the attributes).

Having thus described the nature of the eleven sense organs, the specific functions of the first ten sense organs are being described:

रूपादिषु पञ्चानाम् आलोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः ।
वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

Pañcānām, The function of the five senses; *rūpādiṣu,* in respect of form and the rest; *ālocanamātram iṣyate,* is considered to be mere observation; *pañcānām vṛttiḥ,* the functions of the other five; *vacana,* (are considered to be) speech; *ādāna,* manipulation; *viharaṇa,* locomotion; *utsarga,* excretion; *ca,* and; *ānaṁdaḥ,* gratification.

28. The function of the five in respect to form and the rest, is considered to be mere observation. Speech, manipulation, locomotion, excretion and gratification are the functions of the other five.

The function of the organs of knowledge is said to be mere observation. A simple apprehension of the objects is observation. Speaking, handling, walking, excretion and gratification are the functions of the five organs of action. The organ located in the throat, palate etc is speech and speaking is its function. The functions of other organs are clear.

The functions of the three internal organs are now described:

स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या ।
सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २९ ॥

Trayasya, of the three internal instruments; *svālakṣaṇyaṁ,* their own characteristics; *Vṛttiḥ,* are their respective functions; *sā eṣā,* And these same functions; *asāmānyā bhavati,* are peculiar to each; *sāmānya-karaṇa-vṛttiḥ,* The common modifications of the instruments; *prāṇādhyāḥ-vāyavaḥ-pañca,* are the five airs such as the Prāṇa and the rest.

29. Of the three internal organs, their own characteristics are their functions: this is peculiar to each. The common

modification of the instruments is the five airs such as prāṇa and the rest.

The term *svālakṣaṇyam* means those having their own distinct special characteristics and they are the Mahat, the Great Principle, ahaṁkāra, the I-Principle and the manas, the mind. The distinct characteristics are their natures too. They are the properties which serve as the distinguishing mark of each internal organ. They also denote their respective functions; they are: determination is of the Will (*Buddhi*), ego-centricity of the I-Principle (ahaṁkāra) and observation of the mind (Manas).

Function is of two kinds: common and specific. This is stated: *they are peculiar* to each. The vital airs are five beginning with *Prāṇa.* They form the common functions of the internal organs. These five vital airs are the very life of the three internal organs since the latter exist when they exist and cease to exist when they are absent. Of the five vital airs, the *Prāṇa* is located at the tip of the nose, the heart, the navel, feet and the thumb; *apāna* is located in the nape of the neck, the back, the feet, the anus, the generative organ and the sides; *Samāna,* in the heart, the navel and all the joints; *Udāna,* in the heart, the throat, the palate, the head, and between the eye-brows; *vyāna* is located in the skin. These are the five Vital Airs.

The author next describes the order of functions, both successive and simultaneous, of the four-fold organs (the three internal organs and the external organs):

युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमशश्च तस्य निर्दिष्या ।
दृष्टे तथाप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥

dṛṣṭe, with regard to the perceptible; *catuṣṭayasya tu,* of the set of four; *Yugapat vṛttiḥ,* the functions are simultaneous; *tasya krama-śaśca,* and also successively; *nirdiṣṭā,* are said to be; *tathā api adṛṣṭe,* and also with regard to the imperceptible; *trayasya vṛttiḥ,* the functions of the three; *tat pūrvikā,* are preceded by that.

30. Of all the four, the functions are said to be simultaneous and also successive with regard to the seen objects; with regard to the unseen objects, (and also seen objects) the functions of the three are preceded by that.

Dṛṣṭe - simultaneous with the perceptible objects: For example, when one sees in darkness, by means of the flash of lightning, a tiger facing him, then all the four, viz observation (by the eyes), consideration (by the mind) identification with the self (by the I-Principle) and determination (by the Buddhi) take place simultaneously, and he runs away from that place at once. Again *successively.* This is as when a man sees vaguely in dim light a certain thing; then, applying his mind intently, he observes that he is a very cruel robber with his bow stretched to his ear and arrows aimed at him; then his *ahaṁkāra* makes himself conscious that he (the robber) is approaching him; lastly, his will (*Buddhi*) determines that he should run away from that place. But with regard to unseen things, the three internal organs, viz, Mind, will, and the I-Principle, operate without the help of the external organs - this is pointed out by the text in the statement: *the functions of the three are preceded by that.* That is to say, the simultaneous as well as the successive functions of the three internal organs are preceded by perception of some object. Verily the cognition arising from inference, valid Testimony and Remembrance is preceded by a knowledge of sense perception and not otherwise.[13]

As in the case of perceptible things, so also is with regard to imperceptible things.[14]

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13. That is to say, nothing can be cognised if it had not previously been seen by the senses. Thus, there can be no inference or testimony or recollection of what has *never been* perceived earlier.
14. The functioning of the internal organs is possible only when there is already a knowledge gained by means of direct sense perception of some external object.

Objection: The functions of either the set of four or the set of three, cannot be depending on themselves alone; for, in that case, the organs being everlasting, their functions too would be everlasting; on the other hand, if they are mere adventitious (ie transient), then their functions too would be adventitious which again would cause an admixture of the functions, there being nothing to regulate them.

This is answered in the following verse:

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुकां वृत्तिम्।
पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित्कार्यते करणम्॥ ३१॥

Svāṁ svāṁ vṛttim, To their respective functions; *pratipadyante,* they enter into; *paraspara - ākūta - hetukāṁ,* being incited by mutual impulses. *Puruṣārtha eva hetuḥ,* the purpose of the Puruṣa is the sole motive; *na kenacit,* by none whatsoever; *karaṇam kāryate,* is an organ made to act.

31. The organs enter into their respective modifications being incited by mutual impulse. The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive (for the activity of the organs). By none whatsoever is an organ made to act.

Karaṇāni (sense organs) must to be supplied to the above verse as the subject of the verse.

When a number of men wielding lances, sticks, bows and swords etc, having determined beforehand as to their respective roles, engage themselves in overpowering a common enemy, they proceed to act only on knowing each other's impulse, and while acting the lance-wielder uses only lance and not stick etc; similarly, the stick-wielder uses only the stick and not weapons like lance etc. In the same manner, each of the organs operates only by the reason of the impulse to action by the other organ. This impulse being the cause of functions of the organs, there cannot arise any admixture of functions (as the impulse acts as the regulating motive power).

Objection: But the lancers etc are sentient beings. It is, therefore, quite appropriate to say that they act having comprehended each others' impulse. Whereas, the organs are insentient; as such, they can never motivate others to act. Consequently, the organs can be motivated to act only by a controller who is cognisant of the nature, capacity and uses of the organs.

This is answered: *The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive; by nothing else is an organ made to act.* The sole motive of the organs is to fulfil the purpose of the Puruṣa in the form of bringing about the experience of unfulfilled enjoyment, and emancipation to the Puruṣa. Consequently, there is no need to postulate an intelligent controller cognisant of the nature of the organs etc. This has further been elucidated in the verse 'Just as the secretion of milk is for the sake of the nourishment of the calf' etc. (Kārikā 57).

It has been declared in the verse that by none else whatsoever is an organ made to act. Now, in the following verse, the organs are being clarified.

करणं त्रयोदशविधम् तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ।
कार्य्यं च तस्य दशधाऽऽहार्य्यं धार्य्यं प्रकाश्यं च ॥ ३२ ॥

Karaṇaṁ, The organs; *trayodaśavidhaṁ,* are of thirteen kinds; *Tad āharaṇa,* it (performs the action of) seizing; *dhāraṇa,* sustaining; *prakāśakaraṁ,* (and) illuminating; *Tasya kāryam ca,* and its objects; *daśadhā,* are ten-fold; *āhāryaṁ,* the seized; *dhāryaṁ,* the sustained; *prakāśyaṁ ca* and the illumined.

32. Organs are of thirteen kinds performing the functions of seizing, sustaining and illuminating. Its objects are of ten kinds, viz, the seized, the sustained and the illumined.

The sense organs are eleven. Will and the I-Principle are the other two organs; thus, taken together, the organs are thirteen. An organ is a special kind of active agent. This agency cannot be there unless it has the capacity to function. Hence, the functions

of the organs are next stated: *Performing the functions of seizing etc.* The organs of action such as the Speech etc perform the function of seizing; that is, they pervade and apprehend their respective objects by their operations over them, while the Will, the I-Principle, and the Mind, sustain them by their respective functions in the form of the Vital Airs; and the organs of knowledge illumine their respective objects.

The functions such as seizing, sustaining etc must have their objects; hence, they are being named and classified: *And its objects etc.* The objects of the thirteen kinds of organs are ten-fold, in the form of the *apprehended, sustained* and *illumined.* To *seize* is *to pervade:* the organs of action pervade over speech, seizing locomotion, excretion and gratification respectively. And, they each being celestial and non-celestial, seizing is ten-fold. Similarly, the object to be sustained by the three internal organs through their functions in the form of the Vital Airs etc is the body which is an aggregate of the five elementary substances such as the earth etc. The earth is an aggregate of five elements of sound etc. Each of these five elements being celestial and non-celestial, it becomes ten-fold; hence, the objects to be sustained also become ten-fold. In a similar way, the organs of knowledge too pervade their respective objects, viz, sound, touch, form, taste and odour. They also being celestial and non-celestial, are ten-fold, and hence, the objects to be illumined by them also become ten-fold.

A further sub-division of the thirteen organs is made:

अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा बाह्यम् त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् ।
साम्प्रतकालं बाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥

Aṅtaḥkaraṇaṁ trividhaṁ, The internal organ is three-fold; *bāhyam daśadhā,* the externals are ten-fold; *trayasya viṣayākhyam,* (they are) called the objects of the three; *bāhyaṁ,* the external; *sāmpratakālaṁ,* functions at the present time; *ābhyaṅtaram*

karaṇam, the internal organs; *trikālam,* (function) at all three times.

33. The internal organ is three-fold. The external is ten-fold; they are called the objects of the three (internal organs). The external organs function at the present time and the internal organs function at all the three times.

The internal organs are three, viz, Will (*buddhi*), I-Principle (*ahaṁkāra*) and Mind (*Manas*). They are known as internal organ as they are located inside the body. The external organs are ten; they are known as the objects of the internal three organs inasmuch as they are the channels through which the internal organs operate in apprehending, self-identifying and determining objects. Here, organs of *Buddhi* and the rest function by apprehending things, and the organs of action function by their respective operation on the objects. The specific differences between the external and the internal organs are next declared: *The externals act at the present time and the internal organs at all the three times.* The term *present time* suggests also time immediately preceding and immediately following; because of this, speech also becomes an object of the present. The internal organs function at all points of time, as found in the examples: (a) It had rained because the river has become full with water (indicates the *past*); there is fire in the mountain because there is smoke (indicates the *present*); it would rain provided no obstacles are there, because, we see ants carrying eggs (indicates the future). Here, following the events, the internal organs apprehend, become self-conscious, and determine (the occurences at all the three points of time).

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, Time is one indivisible thing and as such it does not admit of conventional divisions such as present, past etc. This conventional division of time as past, present etc is owing to adventitious conditions. The teachers of Sāṅkya, however, hold that the very same adventitious conditions

as past, present etc may be considered as the basis for the conventional notions of future, present and past. Therefore, there is no need for postulating another intervening entity as Time.

Now the Author discusses about the objects of the external organs, operating at the present time.

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।
वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥ ३४ ॥

Teṣāṁ, Of these; *pañca buddhi indriyāṇi,* the five organs of knowledge; *viśeṣa-aviśeṣa-viṣayāṇi,* have, as their objects, both gross (specific) as well as subtle (non-specific). *Vāk,* The Speech; *śabda-viṣayā-bhavati,* has sound as its object; *Śeṣāṇi tu,* but the rest; *pañcaviṣayāṇi,* have all the five as their objects.

34. Of these, the five organs of knowledge have, as their objects, both the gross as well as the subtle. Speech has sound as its object; the rest have all the five as their objects.

Of the ten external organs, the five organs of knowledge have, for their objects, both the specific and non-specific. The *specific* objects are the *gross* sound and the rest (touch, colour, taste and odour) in their *calm, turbulent* and *deluding* forms (*śāṅta, ghora,* and *mūḍha*), abiding in the form of *earth* and the rest (ie Water, Air, Fire and Ākāśa). The *non-specific* are the subtle forms of sound and the rest, in the form of Primary elements (*Tanmātras*). The particle *mātra* in *Tanmātra* serves to eliminate gross forms of the elements. Those alone are the organs of knowledge which have for its objects both the gross and subtle things. For example, the great sages and ascetics perceive both the subtle elements of sound (*śabda Tanmātra*) and also the gross form of sound; but ordinary people like ourselves are capable of perceiving only the gross form of sound; similarly, the tactile organ of these ascetics is capable of perceiving both the gross and the subtle touch, whereas our tactile organ perceives objects of gross touch only. Similarly, the eye and other organs of those

ascetics can perceive colour and the rest in their subtle as also gross forms, while our organs can perceive their gross forms only.

Among the organs of action, speech has sound as its object, because, the organ of speech is the cause of the gross sound. But it cannot produce the Primary element of sound which is the evolute of the I-Principle, inasmuch as Speech also is an evolute of the I-Principle (ie both the organ of speech and the primary element of sound are the direct evolutes of *Ahaṁkāra*). The rest of the organs of action such as the Anus, the Generative organ, the Hand and Feet have, for their objects, the Jar and such other things which can be manipulated by hand etc as they are of the nature of five elements of sound, colour, touch, taste and odour.[15]

Among the thirteen organs, some are principal ones; some are subordinate ones; the reason for the same is being stated:

सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।
तस्मात् त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥

Yasmāt, Because; *Buddhiḥ,* the Will or Intelligence; *śāṅtaḥ-karaṇāḥ,* together with other internal organs; *sarvaṁ viṣayaṁ avagāhate,* comprehends all objects; *tasmāt,* therefore; *trividhaṁ* these three-fold; *Karaṇaṁ dvāri,* organs or instruments are the warders; *śeṣāṇi,* (and) the rest; *dvārāṇi,* are the doors.

35. Since buddhi along with the other internal organs, comprehends all objects, these three organs are like the warders while the rest are like the gates.

The warders are the principal organs. While the other external organs are the doors, ie are mere instruments. They are only subordinate organs because the *buddhi* along with the mind

15. The foot treads upon the earth which has all the elements of sound and the rest as its characteristic. The excretory organ separates the earthen element in which these five abide. The organ of generation produces secretion in which all the five elements are present.

and *ahaṁkāra,* determines all objects that are exhibited by the external organs. Therefore, the external organs are like the *doors* whereas the *Buddhi* along with other internal organs is like the *Warder.*

Buddhi is principal not only in relation to the external organs but also in relation to the warders, ie the internal organs, viz, the I-Principle and the mind. This is stated in the following verse:

एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।
कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छति ॥ ३६ ॥

Ete, these (ten external organs, *manas* and *ahaṁkāra*); *pradīpa-kalpāḥ,* resemble a lamp (in action); *paraspara vilakṣaṇāḥ,* characteristic-wise different from one another; *guṇaviśeṣāḥ,* are different modifications of the attributes; *Kṛtsnam prakāśya,* illuminating all; *puruṣasyārtham,* for the purpose of the Spirit; *buddhau prayacchati,* presents (all objects) to buddhi.

36. These (external organs with the Mind and the I-Principle) which are characteristic-wise different from one another, and are different modifications of the attributes, and which resemble a lamp, illuminating all (their respective objects) present them to the *Buddhi* for the purpose of the Spirit, (ie for their exhibition to the Spirit).

The chief officer of the village collects taxes from the heads of different families, and delivers it to the head of the District; he, in turn, delivers it to the Head of all the Districts who in turn hands it over to the king. In like manner, here also, the external organs, having perceived objects, present them to the mind which observes them and presents them to the I-Principle which taking a personal cognisance, presents them to the *Buddhi* who is like the Head of all of them. That is why it is said in the text: *These, illuminating all objects, present them to the Buddhi for the purpose of the Spirit.*

The external organs, the Mind and the I-Principle are the various modifications of the Attributes, ie they are the various mutations of the *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas* Attributes. Though they are mutually condradictory by their very nature, yet, they are led in unison for the purpose of the *Puruṣa* in the form of bringing experiences of enjoyment and emancipation. It is just like the wick, oil and fire, though opposed to each other (in their individual action) combine together in the form of a lamp in order to illuminate forms, colours etc. This meaning has to be applied to the statement in the verse: *ete guṇaviśeṣāḥ.*

Objection: Why is it that the other organs present their impressions to the *Buddhi?* Why should not the *Buddhi* present its impressions to the *Ahaṁkāra,* or to the *manas* which are like the *Warders* (as mentioned before)? This is answered:

सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात्पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः ।
सैव च विशिनष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ३७ ॥

Yasmāt, Because; *Buddhiḥ,* it is the Buddhi; *puruṣasya upabho-gam,* for the experience of the Puruṣa; *sarvam pratisādhayati,* accomplishes with regard to all objects; *sa eva ca punaḥ,* And it is that alone; *sūkṣmam,* subtle; *pradhānapuruṣāṅtaram,* difference between the *Puruṣa* and the *Pradhāna; Viśinaṣṭi,* discriminates.

37. Because, it is the *Buddhi* that accomplishes the experiences with regard to all objects to the Puruṣa. It is that again that discriminates the subtle difference between the *Pradhāna* and the *Puruṣa.*

The sole motive of the organs to act is to serve the purpose of the Spirit; that alone could be the principal organ which accomplishes this purpose directly; among the organs, the *Buddhi* alone does this directly; hence, that alone is considered to be the Principal organ, just like the Governor being considered superior to all other chiefs by virtue of his being the direct Agent of the

King, while others such as the village heads etc, are only of secondary importance when compared to the former. It is the *Buddhi* alone that accomplishes the experiencing of all objects to the Spirit by pretending to be the Spirit itself due to the reflection of the Spirit in the *Buddhi* owing to its proximity to the Spirit. Experiencing consists in the enjoyment of feelings of pleasure and pain; this feeling takes place in the *Buddhi;* The *Buddhi* appears as if it has assumed the form of the Spirit; thus the *Buddhi* makes the Spirit undergo these experiences. Just as perception, observation and self-consciousness of things get transmitted to the *Buddhi* by taking their own respective forms, the functions of the senses too, in a similar way, become identified with *Buddhi* in its own operation in the form of determining. It is just like the troops of the village-chief becoming one with the troops of the Governor. In a similar way, the *Buddhi* accomplishes for the *Puruṣa* experiences of all things in the form of *sound* etc.

Objection: If the *Buddhi* is the one that accomplishes the experiences for the Puruṣa in respect to all the objects, then, no emancipation is ever possible. This is answered: *it is again* etc. It discriminates the difference between the *Puruṣa* and the *Pradhāna.* Here, the usage of the term *aṅtaram viśinaṣṭhi - discriminates the difference,* is similar to the usage of the clause *odanapākam pacati-* cooks the cooking of rice.[16] Thus is shown that emancipation is the purpose of the Spirit. Since the difference between the Puruṣa and the Pradhāna is only artificial it should be transient; then, the emancipation brought about by the discrimination of that difference also must be transient. This is

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16. The idea is this: the term *Viśinaṣti* has been explained as *'discriminates the difference.'* Thus, the mention of *aṅtaram* also seems to be superflouous. The example of *odanapākam* is cited to point out that the usage of *aṅtaram* is not superfluous. It only helps in emphasising the meaning of the sentence.

answered: *subtle* etc. The said difference is subtle, ie it is difficult to perceive. 'Pradhāna is subject to modifications. I am different from that' - this difference is ever existing; but due to the absence of discrimination, the *Buddhi* just creates an awareness that there is no difference; but it does not *create* that difference due to which only transiency could be implied. The organs have been described: Now the author describes the specific as well as the non-specific objects.

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषास्तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।
एते स्मृता विशेषाः शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

Tanmātrāṇi aviśeṣāḥ, The Tanmātras are the indiscernibles; *tebhyo pañcabhyaḥ,* from these five; *pañca bhūtāni,* proceed five gross elements. *ete viśeṣāḥ smṛtāḥ,* these are remembered as the discernibles; *śāṅtāḥ,* calm; *ghorāḥ,* turbulent; *mūḍhāḥ ca,* and deluding.

38. The tanmātras are the indiscernible; from these five proceed the five gross elements; they are remembered as the discernibles, because, they are calm, turbulent and deluding.

Sound and the rest are the *Tanmātras,* ie they are the subtle forms. The term *mātra* (in *Tanmātra*) indicates that these Primary elements are devoid of specific characteristics such as *calmness* etc which alone render them fit to be experienced (as pleasure, pain etc).

Having described the non-specific things (*aviśeṣān*), the author now, in order to describe the *specific* objects, mentions the manner of their production by stating: *from these .....etc.* From these five Primary elements of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour, proceed respectively, the five gross elements of *Ākāśa,* Air, Fire, Water and Earth.

Objection: Let these five gross elements be produced from the five Primary elements, but what about their specific characteristics?

Answer: *These are remembered as the specifics.* Why? Because, they partake of the nature of *calmness, turbulence* and *delusion.* The first *ca* (in the text) indicates the *reason;* the second *ca* (in the text) indicates the cumulative force (ie the things have all the three characteristics of calmness etc). Among the gross elements like the *ākāśa* and the rest, abounding in *sattva* Attributes, some are calm, happy, pleasant and buoyant; some, abounding in *Rajas* attribute, are turbulent, miserable, and unstable; some, abounding in *Tamas* attribute, are deluded, despondent, and sluggish. These gross elements, which are objects of experience, being distinguished from each other, are said to be *discrenible* (*viśeṣa*) and *gross* (*sthūla*). But the Primary elements (*Tanmātras*) distinguished from each other, are not the objects of our experience; hence they are said to be non-discernible (*aviśeṣāḥ*) and *subtle* (*sūkṣmāḥ*).

A further sub-division of the *specific* objects is next mentioned:

सूक्ष्माः मातापितृजाः सह प्रभूतैः त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः ।
सूक्ष्मास्तेषाम् नियता मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥

Sūkṣmāḥ, the subtle bodies; *mātāpitṛjāḥ,* the bodies born of father and mother; *saha prabhūtaiḥ,* together with gross elements; *tridhā viṣeṣāḥ syuḥ,* are the three kinds of the Specific; *teṣām,* Amongst them; *sūkṣmāḥ niyatāḥ,* the subtle bodies are everlasting; *mātā-pitṛjāḥ,* the bodies born of father and mother; *nivartante,* are perishable.

39. The subtle bodies, bodies born of parents, together with gross elements are the three kinds of the specific. Of these, the subtle bodies are everlasting and those born of the parents are perishable.

The Specific objects are three-fold. They are mentioned. (a) Subtle bodies are presumed (as they are not perceptible). In order to become perceptible, it must have some extra

qualification or *viśeṣaṇa* by means of which it becomes distinguished from others. Here, the *Viśeṣaṇa* is the property of causing pleasure, pain and delusion, which constitute the nature of the three Attributes. These are absent in the *tanmātras* but are present in *sthūla bhūtas.*[17]

(b) The bodies born of father and mother consist of six sheaths. Among these six, hair, blood and flesh are from the mother; arteries, bones and marrow are from the father. These six are the six sheaths (of the body).

(c) *Prabhūtāni* are the Great or gross elements. Along with these great elements, the other two constitute the specific. Thus, the subtle body is the first kind of *specific* object; bodies born of parents are the second kind; and the gross elements are of the third kind. Objects like the jar etc are included in the class of *gross elements:* The difference between the subtle body and the body born of parents is next explained: *the subtle body among them.....etc.* The meaning is that among the specific things those that are subtle, are *lasting* while those born of parents are perishable, ie they dissolve into either fluids (when buried) or ash (when burnt) or putrid matter (when left to decay).

Now the subtle body is being classfied:

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतं महदादि सूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम् ।
संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

Liṅgam, The mergent (subtle) body; *pūrvotpannaṁ,* is produced at the beginning of creation; *asaktaṁ,* unconfined; *niyataṁ,* constant; *Mahat-ādi-sūkṣma paryaṅtam,* is composed of *tattvas,* beginning with the *Mahat* and ending with the subtle Tanmātras;

17. Though both the *tanmātras* and the *sthūla bhūtas* are material, yet, there is a marked difference between them. The *Tanmātras* are devoid of viśeṣaṇa-s; hence are non-specific or non-discernible; while the gross elements are specific or discernible as they have the special properties of pleasure, pain etc; and thus become fit for experience. This is an evolution downward.

saṁsarati, migrates; *nirupabhogam,* devoid of experience; *bhāvaiḥ adhivāsitam,* tinged with dispositions.

40. The mergent subtle body, produced primordially, unconfined, constant, composed of the *Tattvas* beginning with *Mahat* and ending with *tanmātras,* transmigrates, free from experience, and tinged with dispositions.

Produced primordially means that at the begining of creation by the *Pradhāna,* the subtle body was evolved one for each *Puruṣa. Not confined* because it is unobstructed; as such, it can pass through even a mountain. *Constant* because it continues to exist from the first evolution to the time of final dissolution. The Subtle body is composed of the Mahat down to subtle Tanmātras, that is to say, the subtle body is an aggregate of *Mahat* (Will), I-Principle, the eleven sense-organs and the five Primary elements. It is *specific* because it is endowed with the sense organs which are calm, turbulent and delusive.

Objection: Let this subtle body itself be the field of experience for the Spirit; where then is the need for a perceptible physical body comprised of the six sheaths (as mentioned above)?

Answer: *it migrates* - ie the subtle body transmigrates from body to body, ie it gives up and again occupies the six-sheathed physical body one after the other. Why so? Because, it is *devoid of experience.* The subtle body is incapable of having any ex-perience without a physical body of six sheaths; that is why it migrates.

Objection: Transmigration is caused by Virtue and Vice and the subtle body has no connection with them. Then, how does the subtle body migrate?

Answer: The text answers: *it is tinged with dispcsitions.* The dispositions are Virtue and Vice, knowledge and ignorance, passion and dispassion, power and weakness. The *Buddhi* is endowed with all this and the subtle body is connected to the *Buddhi.* Thus, the subtle body also becomes tinged with those

dispositions. It is just like a piece of cloth becoming perfumed with the sweet fragrance of the champaka flower by virtue of the cloth coming in contact with that flower. Thus, becoming tinged with those dispositions, the subtle body migrates. (That is to say, affectation by these dispositions is the cause of transmigration).

Question: Like the *Pradhāna,* why not the subtle body also remain at the time of final dissolution?

Answer: Because it is the *mergent.* That which gets dissolved is the *liṅgam* or mergent. The meaning is that it gets dissolved in its cause. (It is a product, a combination of things; therefore, it being a product, it suffers resolution in its cause at the time of Final Dissolution).

Objection: Let it be so; But why not the *Buddhi* itself migrate accompanied by the I-Principle and the sense-organs? Where then is the need to assume the migration by the subtle body for which there is no proof?

This is answered in the following verse:

चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथा छाया ।
तद्वद्विना विशेषैर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥

Yathā citram, As a painting; *Āśrayam ṛte,* (cannot stand) without a support; *yathā chāyā,* even as a shadow; *sthāṇvādibhyo vinā,* (cannot be) without a stake etc; *tadvat,* similarly; *liṅgam na tiṣṭhati,* the *liṅga* does not subsist; *Viśeṣaiḥ vinā,* without the subtle body; *nirāśrayam,* without a support.

41. As a painting cannot stand without a support, as a shadow cannot be without a stake, similarly, the *liṅga* also cannot subsist without a subtle body and without a support.

Liṅgam in the text means the *Buddhi* and the rest (ie the I-Principle, the Mind, the senses and the five Tanmātras) because they make things known, and that cannot subsist without a substratum. Here, the following syllogism is given: 'During the intervening period between death and rebirth, the *Buddhi* and the

rest are supported by a refined body; because they are endowed with the refined five Primary elements; like the Buddhi etc as found in the perceived physical body.' *Without the specific body,* ie without the subtle body. There is a scriptural text in this connection: 'Then yama extracted by force the Spirit of the size of the thumb' (from the body of Satyavān - Mahābhārata). Here, the thumb-sized *Puruṣa* implies the fact of its being the subtle body because of the impossibility of the extraction of *Puruṣa.* As such, the *Puruṣa* here stands for the subtle body only. Here the word *puruṣa* has the sense of *that which sleeps in the gross body (puri śete).* Having thus explained the existence of the subtle body, the author next states the reason and the manner of its migration:

पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिक प्रसङ्गेन ।
प्रकृतेर्विभुत्व योगान्नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ॥ ४२ ॥

Idam Liṅgam, This subtle body; *naṭavat,* like a dramatic actor; *vyavatiṣṭhate,* appears in different roles; *puruṣārthahetukam,* which has the purpose of *Puruṣa* as its motive; *nimitta-naimittika-prasaṅgena,* by association with instrumental causes and effects; *prakṛteḥ vibhutva yogāt,* from conjunction with the all-embracing power of Nature.

42. Impelled by the purpose of Puruṣa, this subtle body appears in different roles, like a dramatic performer, by means of association with instrumental causes and their effects, through the all-embracing power of Nature.

The subtle body is formed for the purpose of the Spirit. *nimittam* (efficient) *causes* are virtue, vice etc *naimittikam* - *effects* are in the form of taking up of various kinds of physical bodies consisting of six sheaths which are born in consequence of the force of virtue etc. So, by association with virtue, vice etc various bodies are produced. Like an actor in a drama, the subtle body appears in various roles. An actor, while acting in a drama,

takes on the roles of Paraśurāma, or Ajātaśatru, or Vatsarāja; in a similar way, the subtle body also, taking on the gross physical body, acts like a god or a man, an animal or a tree.

Question: Whence does it get such a great power?

Answer: *From its conjunction with the all-embracing power of Nature.* Declares the Purāṇa: 'This evolution is wonderful indeed on account of the all-embracing Might of Nature.'

It has been explained above that the subtle body acts owing to its connection with causes and effects. The Author now classifies the cause and effects:

संसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृताश्च धर्माद्याः ।
दृष्टाः करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥ ४३ ॥

Dharmādyāḥ bhāvāḥ, Dispositions such as Virtue and the rest; *sāṁsiddhikāḥ,* are innate; *prākṛtikāḥ ca,* and are of Nature; *Vaikṛtikāḥ ca,* and incidentals or acquired; *Karaṇāśrayiṇaḥ dṛṣṭāḥ,* they are seen as residing in Buddhi; *Kalalādyāḥ ca,* and the ovum etc; *Kāryāśrayiṇaḥ,* reside in the effect.

43. Virtue and other dispositions are innate, of Nature, and acquired. They are seen as residing in *Buddhi;* the ovum (female sex cells) and the rest reside in the body.

Vaikṛtaḥ (in the text) are *Vaikṛtikāḥ* which are the effects. *Prākṛtikāḥ,* dispositions are dispositions of Nature, springing from the *Prakṛti.*[18] Sāṁsiddika dispositions are the innate dispositions. They are produced from the means already in existence; for example, it is declared that at the beginning of creation, the Primordial Sage Lord Kapila appeared endowed with the four dispositions of Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. The incidental dispositions are not innate; they are brought about by personal efforts, like the Virtues belonging to great sages like

18. From the highly refined forms of Prākṛtic matter are born the perpetually youthful bodies, like those of the four sons of Brahmā, viz, Sanaka, Sanaṁdana, Sanātana and Sanatkumāra.

Vālmīki and others. It is also the same with regard to dispositions like Vice, Ignorance, Passion and Weakness.[19]

Where are they seen? This is answered by saying:

Karaṇāśrayiṇaḥ - they reside in the Karaṇa. Karaṇa is the *Buddhi Tattva. Kāryam* is the body. Hence, those that reside in the body is *Karaṇāśrayiṇaḥ.* The aggregate formed of the ovum (*Kalala*), foetus, (*budbuda*) (the embryo, one night after conception, is known as *Kalala,* after five nights it is known as *budbuda*) and flesh, muscles and every other organ like the liver etc are the various states of formation of the body while in the womb; so also the childhood, youth, old age etc are the various forms of the body after it comes out of the womb.

Question: Causes and their effects in general are understood by us; but, what are the special effects of special causes?

This is answered:

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण ।
ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो विपर्य्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥ ४४ ॥

Dharmeṇa, By means of Virtue; *ūrdhva-gamanaṁ,* upward ascent; *adharmeṇa,* by Vice; *adhastād gamanam bhavati,* takes place the downward descent; *jñānena ca,* and by Knowledge; *apavargaḥ,* is release or emancipation; *Viparyayāt,* from the reverse (of Knowledge); *baṁdhaḥ iṣyate,* bondage is considered.

44. By virtue, ascent to higher planes, and by vice, descent to lower planes take place; by knowledge release is obtained while by the reverse of it (ie by ignorance) one gets bound.

19. Thus there are eight bhāvās; four when *sattva guṇa* predominates, and the reverse four when *Tamoguṇa* preponderates. These eight *bhāvās* are the *nimittas* or efficient causes bringing about particular migrations of the subtle body or *liṁga śarīra.* They operate by connection with their effects, the *naimittikas,* by bringing about the first commingling of blood and semen in the uterus up till the full development of the embryo in the womb.

By following Virtue one attains to the Heaven and higher regions of Light etc. By vice, one goes to the nether regions such as bhūtala etc.[20] *Prakṛti* offers its experiences to the *Puruṣa* only till such time as the discriminative knowledge is not brought about. When the knowledge of discrimination arises, the *prakṛti* ceases from ministering to the *Puruṣa* who having fulfilled all his experiences, has become endowed with discriminative Knowledge. That is why it is said: 'The operations of *Prakṛti* last only till such time as the attainment of discriminative Wisdom.' *From the reverse* means from the wrong knowledge results bondage. This is three-fold; (1) *Prākṛtikaḥ* - related to Nature (2) *Vaikṛtikaḥ* - evolutional and (3) *dākṣiṇaka* - Personal. *Prākṛtika* bondage is for those who mistake the *Prakṛti* for the *Puruṣa* and worship *prakṛti* and contemplate upon it and not on *Puruṣa.* This is the bondage resulting from Nature. The *Purāṇa* speaks about the men who become absorbed in Prakṛti (*Prakṛtilaya*) after death. 'The contemplators of the *Avyakta* (the Unmanifest) continue to live a full hundred thousand years.' The *vaikṛtika* bondage results for those who contemplate only on the evolutes like the elements, the sense organs, the I-Principle and the *Buddhi,* identifying them with the *Puruṣa.* The following has been said with regard to them:

'Daśa manvaṅtarāṇīha tiṣṭhaṅtīndriyaciṅtakāḥ ।
bhautikāstu śataṁ pūrṇaṁ sahasraṁ tvābhimānikāḥ ।।
Bauddhā daśa sahasrāṇi tiṣṭhaṅti Vigatajvarāḥ ।।'
'Te khalvamī videhāḥ yeṣāṁ vaikṛtiko bandhaḥ ।।'

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20. The worlds of Brahmā, Prajāpati, Soma, Indra, Gandharvas, Yakṣas, Rākṣasas and Piśācas extend upward, while the world of beasts, reptiles, birds, trees etc descend downwards. The seven upward planes, one above the other, are: Bhūḥ, Bhuvaḥ, Svaḥ, Mahaḥ, Jana, Tapas and Satya. The seven nether planes, one below the other, are: Atala, Vitala, Sutala, Rasātala, Talātala, Mahātala and Pātāla).

Those who contemplate on the sense-organs live here for ten Manvaṅtaras.[21] Those who contemplate on elements, live for one full hundred Manvaṅtaras; those who contemplate on the I-Principle, live for a thousand, and those who contemplate on the Buddhi, live for ten thousand Manvaṅtaras, free from all anxities.' 'Those who labour under this *vaikṛtika* bondage are the *Videhās.*' The *Dākṣaṇika* bondage results from the performance of sacrifices, like the *Iṣṭāpūrta.* Ignorant of the Puruṣa Tattva, those who undertake charitable works with their minds influenced only by desire for personal gain, suffer from this bondage.

वैराग्यात्प्रकृतिलयः संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् ।
ऐश्वर्यादविघातो विपर्ययात्तद्विपर्यासः ॥ ४५ ॥

Vairāgyāt, From dispassion (divorsed from the knowledge of the Puruṣa); *prakṛtilayaḥ,* is absorption into Prakṛti; *rājasāt rāgāt,* from passion abounding in Rajas Attribute; *saṁsāro bhavati,* results transmigration; *aiśwaryāt,* from power; *avighātaḥ,* results non-impediment. *Viparyayāt,* from the reverse (ie weakness); *tad viparyāsaḥ,* results the contrary of that.

45. From Dispassion results absorption into Prakṛti; from the Passion of *Rajas* results transmigration; from Power results unimpediment and from the reverse results the contrary.

Those who are free from passion but are ignorant of the true nature of Puruṣa, become absorbed in *Prakṛti.* Here *Prakṛti* includes the whole set of evolvent-evolutes such as Prakṛti, Mahat, the I-Principle, the elements and the sense organs. Those who contemplate on them considering them as the Ātman, merge into them. They are born again in course of time.

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21. A Manvaṅtara is the age of a Manu comprising 4,320,000 human years, or 1/14th day of Brahmā whose one day consists of 14 manvaṅtaras. It is said that six such Manvaṅtaras have passed away and we are now living in the seventh Manvaṅtara; 7 more are yet to come.

From the passion of rājasa attribute results transmigration. Here the term *Rājasa* implies the painful character of transmigration because rajas is the source of pain. *From power results unimpediment* of desires. A man of power does whatever he likes. *From the reverse,* ie from the absence of power, there occur obstructions everywhere in fulfilling one's desires.

In order to describe collectively as also severally, the eight dispositions of Buddhi to highlight those that are to be adopted and those that are to be relinquished by those desiring emancipation, the author first describes the dispositions collectively.

एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाऽशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः ।
गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात्तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥ ४६ ॥

Eṣaḥ, This; *pratyayasargaḥ,* is the creation of *Buddhi; ākhyaḥ,* termed as; *viparyayā,* ignorance; *aśakti,* disability; *tuṣṭiḥ,* contentment; *siddhi,* (and) success or perfection; *guṇa-vaiṣamya-vimardāt,* from the mutual suppression of the attributes due to their inequalities; *tasya ca bhedāḥ tu,* the different forms of this; *pañcāśat,* becomes fifty.

46. This is the creation of the *Buddhi,* termed as ignorance, disability, contentment, and perfection. From the mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities, the different forms of this become fifty.

That through which something becomes known is *pratyaya,* ie the *buddhi.* The evolution proceeding from that is the *pratyayasarga. Viparyaya* is ignorance or nescience, and that is the property of the *Buddhi.* Disability resulting from incapacity of the sense-organs also is a property of the *Buddhi.* Similarly, both contentment and success are also the properties of *Buddhi* which will be explained later. Of these, in *ignorance, disability* and *success* are included all the seven Virtues leaving aside wisdom which is included only in *success.* Next, the properties are described severally: *their forms are fifty.* How? *from mutual*

suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities. This inequality may consist either in the unequal degrees of strength of the one *guṇa* in comparison with the other two, or in the combination of the two *guṇas* with that of the third, or in the unequal degrees of weakness of the one in comparison with the other two, or of the two in combination with that of the third. The various degrees of this inequality like preponderance of the one over the other two etc are assumed according to the requirements of particular cases. This leads to mutual suppression by the Attributes, or predominance of one over the other two etc. Thus, the different forms are fifty.[22]

पञ्चविपर्ययभेदाः भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात् ।
अष्टाविंशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधाष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

Pañca, Five; *viparyaya bhedāḥ bhavaṅti,* (are) the divisions of ignorance; *Karaṇa vaikalyāt ca,* and from the impairment of the organs; *aśaktiḥ ca,* and incapacity; *aṣṭāviṁśati bhedhāḥ,* has twnety eight divisions. *tuṣṭiḥ,* contentment; *navadhā,* has nine divisions; *siddhiḥ,aṣṭadhā,* success is eight-fold.

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22. In Kārikās 44 and 45 are given the 8 efficient causes, four from *Sāttvic* predominance and four from *Tāmasic* predominance. To this are to be added their corresponding effects. Thus, we have sixteen-fold causes and effects:

Sāttvic:

Cause	*Effect*
1. Virtue	2. evolution to higher planes.
3. Knowledge	4. emancipation.
5. Dispassion	6. Absorption in Prakṛti.
7. Power	8. Unimpediment in fulfilment of desires.

Tāmasic:

9. Vice	10. descent to nether worlds.
11. Ignorance	12. bondage.
13. Passion	14. Transmigration.
15. Weakness	16. Impedinent to fulfilment of desires.

47. There are five forms of ignorance or error and twenty eight of disability arising from the impairment of the organs. Contentment has nine forms while success has eight forms.

The five forms of ignorance are: Nescience (*avidyā*), egotism (*aśmitā*), attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*), and clinging (*abhiniveśa*); they are respectively known as obscurity (*Tamas*), delusion (*moha*), extreme delusion (*Mahā-moha*), gloom (*Tāmiśra*), and blinding gloom (*aṅdhatāmiśra*). Egotism and the rest are the products of ignorance, hence they are of the nature of ignorance, or when an object is understood erroneously due to nescience, then egotism and the rest come to have the nature of ignorance. It is for this reason that the Blessed Vārṣaganya declared ignorance to be of five divisions. (In the above verse 50 different forms of *Buddhi* have been described).

Now, further sub-division of the five forms of ignorance is described:

भेदस्तमसोऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च दशविधो महामोहः ।
तामिस्रोऽष्टादशधा तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥ ४८ ॥

Tamasaḥ, Of false knowledge; *aṣṭa vidhaḥ bhedaḥ,* there are eight divisions. *Mohasya ca,* and also of delusion; *Mahā mohaḥ,* extreme delusion; *daśavidhaḥ,* is tenfold; *tāmisraḥ,* gloom is; *aṣṭādaśadhā,* is eighteen-fold; *tathā bhavati,* so also is; *aṅdhatāmisraḥ,* the blinding gloom.

48. False knowledge or ignorance is of eight divisions; so also is delusion; extreme delusion is ten-fold; gloom is eighteen-fold and so also is blinding gloom.

Of Ignorance, there are eight divisions. Ignorance consists in imposing the notion of the Spirit on the non-Spirit, Unmanifest, Mahat, I-Principle, and the five Primary elements; this is known as *Tamas* or Darkness. The objects of false identification being eight, it is said that *Tamas* is eight-fold. *Moha,* or delusion also is of eight forms; here, the particle *ca* serves to

connect *eight forms* to *moha* also. The deities having acquired the eight supernatural powers consider themselves as immortal and look upon their occult powers such as *aṇimā* and the rest to be everlasting. This is the delusion caused by Egotism. Since this relates to the eight occult powers, it is said that delusion also is eight-fold. Extreme delusion is ten-fold. Attachment to the five sense objects such as sound and the rest, which are ten-fold being earthly and celestial, is extreme delusion. Since delusion has these ten for its objects, it is said to be ten-fold. *Tāmisra* or aversion is eighteeen-fold. By nature, ten objects such as the sound and the rest are delightful; the eight supernatural powers are, however, not delightful by themselves but they are the means of acquiring sense-objects of delight and craving. The objects of the senses are mutually suppressive and the eight occult powers such as *aṇimā* and the rest which are the means to the attainment of the sense-objects of delight, become incensed. Thus, these eight occult powers together with ten sense-objects like the sound etc become eighteen and these being the objects of aversion, it is said that *Tāmisra* or aversion is eighteen fold. *Aṅdha Tāmisra* is *abhiniveśa,* ie clinging. It is of the nature of blinding darkness. *Tathā* in the text applies to blinding gloom also, signifying eighteen forms of blinding gloom. The Devas (deities) having acquired the eight occult powers like the *Aṇimā* etc are engaged in delightful enjoyment of the ten objects of the senses, such as sound and the rest. They live in perpetual fright of the *Rākṣasas*, thinking that the *Rākṣasas* would snatch away from them those supernatural powers like the *Aṇimā* etc which are the means for enjoying the ten objects of the senses. This fear is known as *clinging* or *Aṅdha Tāmisra* or blinding gloom. It has for its objects the above-said eighteen; hence it is said to be eighteen-fold. These five forms of Ignorance which are but forms of fancy, become sixty two with their sub-divisions.

Having thus described the five forms of Ignorance, next is described the 28 forms of disability:

एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।
सप्तदशवधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४९ ॥

Ekādaśa indriyavadhāḥ, The injuries of the eleven organs; *buddhi vadhaiḥ saha,* together with the injuries of the buddhi; *aśaktiḥ uddiṣṭā,* are considered to be the disabilities. *buddheḥ vadhāḥ,* the injuries to the Buddhi; *saptadaśa,* are seventeen; *tuṣṭi siddhīnām Viparyayāt,* owing to the inversion of contentment and success.

49. The injuries of the eleven organs together with the injuries of the *Buddhi* are considered to be the disabilities. The injuries of the *Buddhi* are seventeen owing to the inversion of contentment and success.

As causes of injuries to the *Buddhi,* they are mentioned as *injuries of the organs* and not as independent forms of disabilities by themselves. The eleven disabilities are:

Bādhiryaṁ Kuṣṭhitā'ndhatvaṁ Jaḍatā'jighratā tathā ।
Mūkatā Kauṇyapaṅgutve Klaibyodāvartta maṅdatāḥ ॥

—*bādhiryam* is deafness, is the disability of the ear; *Kuṣṭhitā* is numbness, is the disability of the skin; *aṅdhatvam,* blindness, the disability of the eye; jaḍatā is tastelessness, the disability of the tongue; *ajighratā,* is insensibility of the olfactory nerves, the disability of the nose; *mūkatā* is dumbness, the disability of the speech; *Kauṇya* is the palsy of the hand, the disability of the hand; *pañgutva,* is lameness, the disability of the foot; *Klaibyaṁ* is impotency, the disability of the generative organ; *udāvarttaḥ* is intestinal paralysis, the disability of the Anus; and *maṅdatā* is stupidity, the disability of the mind. These are the eleven disabilities of the eleven organs such as the auditory organ and the rest. The disability of the *Buddhi* with regard to its own function is caused by the injuries of the senses. The

Buddhi is considered to have eleven disabilities owing to the eleven causes of disability. These have been treated on par because of the theory of non-difference between the cause and the effect.

Having thus described the disabilities of the *Buddhi* through the injury of the sense organs, the natural disabilities of the *Buddhi* itself are described: *together with the disabilities of the Buddhi.* How many are the natural injuries of the *Buddhi* itself? This is answered: *seventeen are the injuries of the Buddhi.* Why? *Due to inversion of contentment and success. Contentment* is nine-fold; hence, the disabilities caused by its inversion are also nine-fold; similarly, success is eight-fold; hence, the disabilities caused by its inversion are also eight-fold. It has been said that contentment is nine-fold. They are being enumerated.

आध्यात्मिक्यश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकाल भाग्याख्याः ।
बाह्या विषयोपरमात्पञ्च च नव तुष्ट्योऽभिमताः ॥ ५० ॥

Nava tuṣṭayaḥ abhimatāḥ, The nine forms of Contentments are considered to be; *Catasraḥ ādhyātmikāḥ,* Four are internals; *ākhyāḥ,* they are named as; *Prakṛti,* Nature; *upādāna,* material; *Kāla,* time; and *bhāgya,* Luck; *Viṣaya uparamāt,* due to abstinence from objects; *bāhyāḥ pañca,* the externals are five.

50. The nine forms of contentment are considered to be (a) four internals named Nature, Material means, Time and Luck; and (b) five externals due to abstinence from objects.

A person has the belief that there is a Spirit quite distinct from the *Pradhāna;* but being wrongly advised, no attempt is made to directly acquire discriminative Wisdom by taking recourse to such practices as hearing, discernment etc and remains satisfied with this wrong advice. Such a one comes to have these four internal contentments. They are internal inasmuch as they are based on the *Ātman* as distinct from *Prakṛti.* Which are these? It is answered: *they are named Nature, Means,*